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Preface
The use of panel data in economic research has become more and more
popular over the last 15 years. Especially the greater availability of panel data
– particularly in developing countries – and the increase of the computational
power of the desktops available have probably played an important role in
their rising utilization.1
Nonetheless, the large number of methodical advantages of panel data com-
pared to pure cross-section or pure time-series data might have contributed to
their increasing importance as well. For example, using panel data provides
the greater possibility to tackle problems such as the existence of individual
heterogeneity and moreover allows to identify effects which otherwise are not
detectable (see Baltagi, 2008, Chapter 1.2). Linked to the former aspect,
panel data also provides the possibility to specify more complex behavioral
models. There are a number of further advantages not mentioned in this
section. However, there is no doubt that panel data helps to improve the
quality of economic analysis. Panel data commonly provides a greater de-
gree of information, joint with a greater degree of variability, which results
in more degrees of freedom, less collinearity among the variables and higher
efficiency, and by this can help to answer a number of research questions
which otherwise might not have been able to be addressed.2
This dissertation consists of three empirical essays using micro panel data
which stem from two important surveys in Germany – the Ifo Business Ten-
dency Survey and the Ifo Innovation Survey for the German manufacturing
industry.
The Ifo Business Tendency Survey is conducted monthly since 1949 and
serves as base for the well-known Ifo Business Climate Index. Before 1991,
only firms from West Germany participated in the survey. Subsequently,
the panel was enlarged to Eastern Germany. The firms are asked questions
about the development of certain key measures – such as the current busi-
ness situation, their expectations or their level of production –, which are
included monthly in the survey. Furthermore, the firms are asked certain
special questions, which are included at a lower frequency or even temporar-
1See Hsiao (2003), Chapter 1.1, Nerlove (2002), Chapter 1.
2See Baltagi (2008), Chapter 1.2, Hsiao (2003), Chapter 1.1.
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ily. Currently, the total number of companies of the manufacturing industry
registered for the survey is about 3200. The participation rate is about 92 %,
resulting in a coverage ratio of about 35 % of the German manufacturing in-
dustry in terms of turnover (see Goldrian, 2004). Overall, besides about 20
identification variables on certain firm characteristics, the dataset provides
over 60 other variables on firm specific developments.
The Ifo Innovation Survey is conducted annually since 1979 for West Ger-
man firms and subsequently was enlarged to East German firms in 1991. The
survey consists of two question complexes: A complex of general questions
relevant for all firms, regardless of their level of innovative activity, and a
complex of more specific questions, relevant particularly for firms which cur-
rently are involved in an innovative activity. The several different questions
on the innovative activity of the firms are classified inter alia by type of in-
novation, input of know-how, expenses, technological focus and complexity.
Moreover, there exist further standard questions such as questions on inno-
vation goals, innovation impulses and innovation obstacles. The coverage
ratio in terms of employees of the manufacturing industry is about 14 % (see
Goldrian, 2004). Besides 9 identification variables and about 30 variables on
general measures of the firm such as turnover, revenue, number of employees
and academic background of the employees, the survey consists of about 700
variables on the innovative activity of the firms – from questions asked since
the start of the survey as well as questions which were included in the survey
only temporarily.3
As the units of observation of the surveys have unique identification variables
and are based on the same population, they can be matched to one large
dataset. This is another huge advantage as it provides the possibility to
address a much bigger range of research questions than usual.4 The following
chapters present examples of how the general advantages of panel data as
well as the specific advantages of the two micro panel datasets can be used
in economic analysis.
3For a more detailed overview about the questionnaires of both surveys, see Becker and
Wohlrabe (2008).
4Remark: Both datasets as well as a matched version are provided by the Economics
& Business Data Center (EBDC), a combined platform for empirical research in business
administration and economics of the Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) and
the Ifo Institute for Economic Research.
VIII
The first chapter analyses the effects of the degree of credit constraints the
firms are facing on their innovative activity. One of the biggest issues present
in the quite extensive literature on this subject is the lack of direct measures
for the degree of credit constraints as well as the innovative activity.5 Dif-
ferent to the data used by earlier research, the matched data allow to use
both a direct measure for the degree of credit constraints as well as a direct
measure for the innovative activity. Furthermore, the design of the survey
questions and the panel structure of the dataset allow to avoid problems com-
monly difficult to solve such as the existence of forward looking adjustments
in a world of expectations or mutual causation, and moreover to analyse po-
tential asymmetries in the effects of above average and below average credit
conditions. As opposed to many other investigations the analysis shows clear
evidence for a negative effect of credit constraints on the innovative activ-
ity of firms. In addition, it shows that below average financing conditions
restrict innovative activity, while above average financing conditions do not
foster it. To explain this novel result the usual theory of innovation activity
is extended by rigidities with respect to a firm’s individual innovation ca-
pacity, which leads to a differentiation between a long run and a short run
equilibrium in innovative output.
The second chapter takes a similar vein. Specifically, this chapter analyses
the effects of innovative activity on the competitiveness of firms. From theory,
innovations are one of the main drivers of the competitiveness, the growth of
an economy, respectively. Accordingly, a huge literature exists analysing the
effects of innovative activity on growth in terms of export shares, sales or em-
ployment. By using the datasets described above the essay contributes to this
literature in several ways: First, the datasets allow to use direct information
on the competitive situation of the company, on the national as well as the
international level. Second, they also allow to use direct information on the
innovative activity of firms, by this avoiding issues of commonly used indirect
measures like the level of investments in R&D or patents. Third, and most
importantly, in the analysis one is able to differentiate between product and
process innovations, where until now only little research is done. The results
show the big importance of innovative activity for the competitive situation
of firms. Moreover, the results show that product innovations contribute to
5For example, for the degree of the credit constraints the firms are facing there mostly
are used some inverse cash flow ratios or other balance sheet measures. For their innovative
activity there mostly is used the level of investment in R&D or the number of patents.
IX
an increase of the competitive situation of the firm, while process innovations
obviously do not, thereby providing evidence for the superior importance of
non-price factors compared to price factors with respect to competitiveness
and growth.
The third chapter connects to a quite large body of macroeconomic literature,
which analyses the effects of oil price shocks on the macroeconomy. The
first section shows that it is difficult to identify negative effects of oil price
increases on the level of the German industrial production by using standard
structural VAR models. By deriving these results with German data the
analysis is in line with an important branch of literature investigating the oil
price macroeconomy relationship for the United States. In the second section
of the chapter, by using the Ifo micro dataset, an analysis on the micro level
is performed, where certain problems such as endogeneity or reverse causality
are circumvented. Here one indeed can observe significant negative effects
of oil price increases on the level of production in Germany. Based on these
results, in a third section information from the micro dataset is processed
and subsequently integrated into the macroeconomic models of section one.
When doing this one can observe a negative effect of oil price hikes on the
level of production also on the macroeconomic level. The last section of
the chapter then consists of a counterfactual analysis, which examines, how
much the oil price hike in 2007/08 contributed to the subsequent recession
in Germany.
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Chapter 1
Financing Conditions, the
Concept of Innovation Capacity
and the Innovative Activity of
Firms
In this chapter a novel survey dataset allows us to use a direct measure for
credit constraints as well as a direct measure for the innovative activity of a
firm to identify the effects of credit constraints on the innovative behaviour of
firms. Furthermore, the design of the survey questions and the panel struc-
ture of the dataset allow us to avoid problems commonly difficult to solve
such as the existence of forward looking adjustments in a world of expecta-
tions or mutual causation, and moreover to analyse potential asymmetries
in the effects of above average and below average credit conditions. As op-
posed to many other analyses we find clear evidence for a negative effect of
credit constraints on the innovative activity of firms. In addition, we find
that below average credit conditions restrict innovative activity, while above
average credit conditions do not foster it. To explain this novel result we
extend the usual theory of innovation activity by rigidities with respect to a
firm’s individual innovation capacity, which leads to a differentiation between
a long run and a short run equilibrium in innovative output.
1
1.1 Introduction
One of the most popular areas of research on credit constraints is their effect
on the innovative activity of firms. This field is of great importance as
innovative activity is considered as one of the main factors for economic
growth and firm performance.
Due to the lack of appropriate data, earlier literature has mostly used indirect
measures as indicators for credit constraints and innovative activity (Bhagat
and Welch, 1995, Harhoff, 1998, Hall et al., 2001, Bond et al., 2006).1 How-
ever, the results concerning the existence as well as the degree of the effects
of credit constraints were far from clear cut. Moreover, the use of the indi-
rect measures was questioned in recent years.2 Due to better availability of
data literature has been published which applies more direct measures (Binz
and Czarnitzki, 2008, Atzeni and Piga, 2007, Hottenrott and Peters, 2009,
Savignac, 2006). Nonetheless, often a direct measure of only one of the vari-
ables of interest – either of the level of credit conditions or of the level of
innovative activity – is available. Moreover, by investigating the effects of
credit conditions on the innovative activity of firms, it often is impossible to
consider problems caused by the existence of forward looking adjustments in
a world of expectations, unobserved heterogeneity, or mutual causation.
This essay contributes to the literature by using a novel dataset to solve
these issues and moreover to analyse aspects which until now have not been
taken into account. First, the dataset provides – unlike other datasets – both
direct information on the degree of the credit constraints as well as direct
information on the beginning of an innovation activity. This helps to avoid
the drawbacks we had until now by using indirect measures. Secondly, the
design of the survey questions and the panel structure of the dataset give
us the possibility of avoiding issues like unobserved heterogeneity or mutual
causation between the dependent variable and its regressors. Third, due to
1Most prominent indirect measures are several inverse cash flow ratios of a company
as proxies for the degree of the credit constraints the firm is facing and the investment in
R&D as proxy for the innovative activity of the firm.
2For example, R&D activities are only one input factor to the innovation process and
all innovations do not necessarily stem from R&D. Furthermore and more severely, the
measure on the degree of credit restrictions is also an indirect one. In this context especially
the use of cash flow ratios as proxies for the credit condition of a firm is questioned (see
Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, Alti, 2003).
2
the availability of variables such as the expectations of a firm concerning the
future business situation we can also deal with problems usually difficult to
solve such as forward looking adjustments in a world of expectations. Finally,
the unique possibility to distinguish between “normal”, “good” and “bad”
credit conditions allows to analyse if there exist asymmetries in the effects
of above average and below average credit conditions.
The results give – unlike those of many other papers – strong evidence that
credit constraints restrict innovative activity. Moreover, the results provide
evidence for asymmetries in the effects of above average and below average
credit conditions. We show that below average credit conditions restrict inno-
vative activity, whereas above average credit conditions do not foster it. This
novel result could support hypotheses, which state that a firm’s innovation
capacity plays an important role in its innovation behaviour. To strengthen
this thesis we expand the usual theory of innovation activity by rigidities
with respect to a firm’s individual innovation capacity, which leads to a dif-
ferentiation between a long run and a short run equilibrium in innovative
output.
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the
conceptual framework for the analysis. Section 3 presents some information
about the survey dataset used in the essay. Section 4 describes our empirical
specification and methodology. Section 5 presents the estimation results.
Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Conceptual Framework
To relate our empirical investigations to theory we use a standard model,
which analyses the effects of financing conditions on innovative activity.3
Subsequently, the model is extended by taking into account rigidities with
respect to a firm’s individual innovation capacity.
Figure 1.1 provides the standard model, which hereafter is referred to as “long
run equilibrium model”. Di is the capital demand curve of the firm, repre-
senting the marginal revenues of capital depending on the level of innovative
3The model inter alia is used by Howe and Mc Fetridge (1976), Carpenter and Petersen
(2002), and Hottenrott and Peters (2009).
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output. The marginal revenues of capital depend on the level of innovation
expenditures I i, firm-specific characteristics F i and industry characteristics
X i. The capital demand curve therefore is defined as Di = f(I i, F i, X i). Si
is the capital supply curve for the company, representing the marginal costs
of capital depending on the level of innovative output. As there exist two
sources of capital supply – internal as well as external sources – we assume a
pecking order. This means that in the first place the firms will use their inter-
nal funds IFi. Afterwards they will start to obtain external financing, with
a positive relationship between the amount of capital and marginal costs.
The intersection of the supply and the demand curves constitutes the equi-
librium innovative output Ie. In this setting, worsening financing conditions,
represented by a steeper supply curve, will lead to higher marginal costs in
equilibrium and lower innovative output. Vice versa, improving financing
conditions, represented by a flatter supply curve, will lead to lower marginal
costs in equilibrium and higher innovative output.
Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework – Long Run Equilibrium
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To underpin our novel findings at the empirical level – the existence of asym-
metries in the effects of above average and below average financing conditions
– we now distinguish between the long run equilibrium provided above and
a short run equilibrium derived in the following. By this means we introduce
the concept of innovation capacity and short term rigidities with respect to
the adjustment of the level of input factors to R&D. The individual innova-
tion capacity is defined as the number of potential innovation projects the
firm is able to produce over a certain period. It may be determined by the
amount of different input factors to R&D – such as the number of researchers
allocated to R&D, their level of know-how or the quality of the technical
equipment related to R&D. How much of these input factors a company ac-
cumulates depends on the firm’s individual capital costs and is determined
in the long run equilibrium (see Figure 1.1). In the long run the firm will
choose its level of input factors to R&D – and accordingly its innovation ca-
pacity – such that it can produce exactly Ie of potential innovation projects.
If it produces on average less than Ie potential projects, this is inefficient as
additional innovation projects still will yield positive net marginal revenues
but cannot be undertaken. If it produces on average more than Ie potential
projects, it is inefficient as not all of the available innovation projects can be
undertaken due to negative net marginal revenues.
However, by introducing adjustment rigidities with respect to the input fac-
tors to R&D, the implications of the model differ from before. Specifically –
and in contrast to the long run equilibrium model – the firms now are facing
a demand function of Di = min[f(I i, F i, X i]); Ie
∗]. This means that the de-
mand curve now is kinked at point Ie (see Figure 1.2). By this we take into
account that – due to the presence of the adjustment rigidities introduced
in the model – in the short run the innovative output cannot be increased
above its maximum level (which is determined by the firm’s innovative capac-
ity, its long run equilibrium Ie). As one can see, in this framework worsening
financing conditions, represented by a steeper supply curve, again lead to
less potential innovation projects being undertaken. However, unlike in the
long run equilibrium model, improving financing conditions, represented by
a flatter supply curve, now have no positive effect on the level of innovative
output, as the maximum level of potential innovative projects is limited to
Ie.
This leads to the result we obtain from our empirical investigations: a dete-
5
rioration of financing conditions decreases innovative activity, while an im-
provement will not foster it (in the short run).
Figure 1.2: Conceptual Framework – Short Run Equilibrium
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1.3 Data
To perform our analysis we use data from two sources: the Ifo Innovation Sur-
vey and the Ifo Business Tendency Survey for German manufacturing firms.4
As the surveys include questions which are asked on different frequencies, we
will transform all variables that are used to the lowest frequency (annual) if
necessary.
The Ifo Innovation Survey is carried out annually. The survey inter alia
4Both datasets are provided by the Economics & Business Data Center (EBDC), a
combined platform for empirical research in business administration and economics of
the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) and the Ifo Institute for Economic
Research.
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asks the firms,5 if they have “started or continued” an innovation project
in the preceding year. As the survey additionally provides information as
to whether the company has “finished” or “stopped” an innovation project,
we can correct for years in which the company only continued an innova-
tion project.6 Innovations are categorized as either product or process in-
novations. The resulting variables are the variable “productinnov”, which is
coded 1, if a product innovation has started in the corresponding year, and
0 otherwise, and the variable “processinnov”, which is coded 1, if a process
innovation has started in the corresponding year, and 0 otherwise.
The Ifo Business Tendency Survey is carried out monthly and contains ques-
tions asked at different frequencies. One of the questions regards the financ-
ing conditions the firms are facing and is included in the survey biannually.
The answers are coded as -1 (“favourable financing conditions”), 0 (“nor-
mal financing conditions”), and +1 (“reserved financing conditions”). These
data are aggregated on an annual basis by taking the averages of the values
of the variable for each year. The variable “credit” resulting from this can
be interpreted as the average financing conditions over the year. It can take
values of 1, 0.5, 0, -0.5, or -1, where the limit value of 1 implies that the
company reported below average financing conditions at both inquiry dates
of the year, and the limit value of -1 implies that the company reported above
average financing conditions at both inquiry dates of the year.7
5Note that each ID-number of the dataset is representing a single production entity for
a single product of the firm rather than the whole firm. This aspect is a further advantage
of the dataset as it allows a more detailed analysis for multi-product firms. However, for
simplicity, in the following we will refer to the particular unit of observation as “firm”.
6To correct the original variable for values indicating only a continuation of an innova-
tion project we proceed as follows. The value of the variable at time t will be converted
from 1 to 0 (i.e. the value of 1 of the variable is indicating a continuation rather than the
start of an innovation project), if there was a start or continuation of an innovation project
in the preceding year (and no finish or stop of an innovation project), and concurrently
no finish or stop of an innovation project in the current period (to prevent that a new
innovation project was started after finishing or stopping another process within the same
year). The possibility that there exist multiple product or process innovations at the same
time is mostly prevented by the fact that each ID-number of the dataset represents a single
production entity for a single product of the firm rather than the whole firm. However,
the estimations using the dataset without the correction provide qualitatively the same
results (see Appendix C).
7Furthermore, a value of 0.5 indicates that the corresponding firm reported below av-
erage financing conditions at one inquiry date of the year and normal financing conditions
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Furthermore, the Ifo business tendency service consists of questions on the
overall business situation of the firm (“situat”) and on the overall expec-
tations of the firm (“expect”)8. The answers to the question regarding the
business situation of the firm are coded as -1 (“bad business situation”),
0 (“normal business situation”), and +1 (“good business situation”). The
answers to the question regarding the firms’ expectations are coded as -1
(“expectations worsened”), 0 (“expectations remained constant”), and +1
(“expectations increased”). As the questions on the business situation and
the expectations of the companies are conducted monthly, the corresponding
variables also have to be aggregated on an annual basis. We do this by again
taking the averages of the values of the variables for each year. The variables
resulting from this can be interpreted as the average business situation over
the year and the change in the firm’s expectations over the year, respectively.
Finally, the business tendency survey provides information on certain firm
characteristics. First of all we can relate to the size of a company in terms of
its market power (“mkp”), which is defined as the number of employees per
firm divided by the number of employees in the firm’s branch. In addition,
each firm is allocated to one of the following 14 manufacturing subsectors:
Food, Beverages and Tobacco; Textiles and Textile Products; Tanning and
Dressing of Leather; Cork and Wood Products except Furniture; Pulp, Pa-
per, Publishing and Printing; Refined Petroleum Products; Chemicals and
Chemical Products; Rubber and Plastic Products; Other Non-metallic Min-
eral Products; Basic and Fabricated Metal Products; Machinery and Equip-
ment; Electrical and Optical Equipment; Transport Equipment; Furniture,
Manufacture. Furthermore, each firm is allocated to one of the following
regions in Germany: East Germany, West Germany, South Germany and
North Germany.
at the other inquiry date of the year. Correspondingly, a value of -0.5 indicates that the
corresponding firm reported above average financing conditions at one inquiry date of the
year and normal financing condition at the other inquiry date of the year. When the vari-
able takes the value 0, the companies mostly have reported normal financing conditions
at both inqiry dates. The situation that a company has reported above average financing
conditions at one inquiry date of the year and below average financing conditions at the
other inquiry date of the year, which also results in a value of the variable of 0, accounts
only for a small minority of cases (34 out of 2898 cases, representing 1.17% of the whole
sample).
8The variable refers to the expectations the firms are facing with respect to the following
6 months.
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We use data for the period from 2003 to 2007. The dataset is organized as
an unbalanced panel. The total number of observations is about 3,000. A
more detailed overview about the questionnaire and the survey variables can
be found in Becker and Wohlrabe (2008).
1.4 The Model
1.4.1 Specification
To identify possible effects of credit restrictions on the innovative activity of
firms we specify the model as
yit = αit + β1creditit + β2expectit + β3situatit + β4mkpit+
+β5exitit + β6Bit + β7Lit + β8Tit + uit.
In our first specification, yit is a dummy variable with value 1, if firm i
started an innovation project (product or process innovation) at time t, and
0 otherwise. In our second and third specifications we distinguish between
product and process innovations. Specifically, we estimate a second model
in which yit is a dummy variable with value 1, if firm i started a product
innovation project at time t, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we estimate a third
model in which yit is a dummy variable with value 1, if firm i started a
process innovation project at time t, and 0 otherwise.
The variable “credit” represents the financing conditions the firm is facing.
The higher the value of the variable, the worse the financing conditions over
the year. It is worthwhile to note that the innovation question in the survey
refers to the start of an innovation activity rather than the achievement of
an innovation. From this follows that the variable is included contemporane-
ously, as it is highly likely that the timing of the financing of an innovation
project is assigned closely to the actual beginning of an innovation activity.
To identify any asymmetries in the effects of below average and above aver-
age financing conditions, we provide alternative specifications where we split
the variable “credit” into two dummy variables. In particular, we create one
dummy variable which is coded 1, if the financing conditions over the year
were worse than normal, and 0 otherwise (“creditdif”). Likewise, we create
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a second dummy variable which is coded 1, if the financing conditions over
the year were better than normal, and 0 otherwise (“crediteas”).
Furthermore, the firms’ decisions to start an innovation project very likely are
influenced by their expectations. As our dataset includes information about
the firms’ expectations, we have the almost unique possibility to control for
this aspect. Consequently, the variable “expect” is introduced, representing
the change in expectations of the firm over the year. The higher the value
of the variable, the more the expectations of the company improved over the
year. As the variable “credit”, the variable “expect” is included contempo-
raneously as a firm will take into account the current rather than the past
expectations when deciding to start an innovation project. To capture the ef-
fects of firm-specific developments we control for the actual business situation
of the firm. The business situation of the firm is represented by the variable
“situat”, which is the higher the better the business situation was over the
year. Similarly to the variable “expect”, the variable “situat” is included con-
temporaneously as a firm will take into account current rather than past firm
developments when deciding to start an innovation project. Beside this, we
introduce the variable “mkp”, which represents the size of the firm in terms of
its relative number of employees compared to the competitors of its branch.
This variable might be of potential relevance as previous research provides
evidence for a clearly positive relationship between the market power and
the level of innovative activity of a firm.
In addition, we control for certain other firm characteristics. To account for a
heterogeneous level of innovation activity between firms of different branches
we include vector Bit, a set of 13 dummy variables which indicate the affil-
iation of the firm to a specific branch.9 For similar reasons – heterogeneity
in the innovation activity of companies of different regions – we include a
further set of dummy variables, represented by vector Lit, which consists of 3
dummy variables indicating the region the company is allocated to.10 More-
over, to take into account possible changes of the innovative behaviour over
time due to major technological or structural developments, we introduce
vector Tit, which consists of 4 time dummies representing the years 2004 to
2007.11
9The baseline branch is the branch “Machinery and Equipment”.
10The baseline region is North Germany.
11The baseline year is the year 2003.
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Finally, we have to address a possible sample selection bias due to attrition,12
as some companies initially included in the survey were discharged from the
survey over time. The main reasons for discharging usually are that the com-
pany is no longer interested in taking part in the survey, that the company
was taken over by another firm or that the company went bankrupt. If the
exit of the companies is not random and there exist some common underlying
reasons that the companies left the survey – e.g. bad overall performance –
there could be some source of sample selection bias in our estimations. In
order to ease this problem we include the dummy variable “exit”, which in-
dicates if a firm has left the survey over the period of the analysis, thereby
capturing firm-specific common characteristics of those firms which were dis-
charged from the survey (see Smolny, 1996).
1.4.2 The Aspect of Endogeneity
As in most analyses, one major point to address is that of endogeneity in its
various forms. This short section deals with this aspect. Specifically, it lists
the different potentially relevant types of endogeneity, discusses how they are
related to our analysis and how the analysis deals with these different types,
if necessary.
The first source of endogeneity is unobserved heterogeneity. In this context
one has to note that the design of the questions of interest in the survey is
such that by their nature firm fixed effects are eliminated.13 This leaves αit,
representing the firm-specific effects, and our independent variables uncorre-
lated and leads us in a first regression to the use of a random effects model,
thereby avoiding the incidental parameter problem commonly present when
applying a fixed effects estimator in this setting (Neyman and Scott, 1948,
Hausman et al., 1984).14
12See Heckman (1979), Smolny (1998).
13The survey asks for the financing conditions and the business situation compared to
their normal firm-specific levels (normal, better than normal, worse than normal), which
by definition eliminates the firm fixed effects with respect to these variables (similarly to
a within-transformation). Furthermore, the survey asks for the change in business expec-
tations on an ordinal scale (improvement/deterioration/no change of business situation),
which also rules out any firm fixed effects concerning this variable.
14The use of the random effects estimator is also supported by the results of a Hausman
test (see Appendix A). However, to take into account potential dynamics of the model
11
The second source of endogeneity possibly relevant is simultaneity between
the response variable and our explanatory variables. For example, it might
not only be possible that a firm’s decision to innovate is influenced by the
firm-specific financing conditions, but also that the firm-specific financing
conditions are influenced by the firm’s decision to innovate. We can control
for this by again using the panel structure of our dataset. In particular, we
apply a two stage least squares instrumental variable probit estimator, which
allows to instrument our potentially endogenous explaining variables by their
first lags.
Finally, when estimating our models for the start of process and product
innovations separately, we have to consider the possible simultaneity of these
two decisions. Specifically, there exists the possibility that the decision of
starting a product innovation is made conditional on the decision of starting
a process innovation and vice versa. To take into account this potential
dependency we additionally apply a bivariate probit estimator when dealing
with these variables.
1.5 Results
Table 1.1 provides the results of our random effects probit panel estimator.
It shows how the financing conditions the firms are facing relate to the prob-
ability of the start of an innovation project (product or process innovation
project) in the corresponding year.
First, when including our original measure of the credit situation in Specifica-
tion 1 we can observe a clearly significant and negative relationship between
worsening financing conditions and the probability that a firm will start an
innovation project. The worse the financing conditions (the higher the value
of our variable “credit”), the smaller the probability that the firm will start
an innovation project in the corresponding year (see Column 1).
Secondly, when splitting our financing conditions measure into below average
(“creditdif”) and above average (“crediteas”) financing conditions and replac-
and to picture persistences possibly existent with respect to our dependent variable we
provide an additional robustness check by introducing the first lag of our response variable
as additional regressor (see Appendix B).
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ing our original variable on the financing conditions with these new variables,
we can observe some asymmetries. The results, presented in Columns 2-4
of Table 1.1, show that financing conditions which were worse than normal
(“creditdif”=1) indeed decrease the probability that a firm will start an in-
novation project, but that in contrast – and against the standard theory –
financing conditions which were better than normal (“crediteas”=1) appar-
ently do not have a significantly positive effect.
Table 1.1: Credit Constraints and Innovative Activity – Random Effects
Probit Model
Innov – Binary Panel Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
credit -0.189 ** - - -
(0.076)
creditdif - -0.223 ** - -0.214 **
(0.084) (0.085)
crediteas - - 0.125 0.066
(0.122) (0.124)
expect 0.187 * 0.190 * 0.183 * 0.188 *
(0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107)
situat 0.293 *** 0.295 *** 0.328 *** 0.292 ***
(0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086)
mkp 1.666 *** 1.698 *** 1.685 *** 1.702 ***
(0.527) (0.527) (0.527) (0.528)
branch yes yes yes yes
region yes yes yes yes
time yes yes yes yes
exit yes yes yes yes
Log-Lik. -1580.86 -1580.43 -1583.44 -1580.29
Observ. 2898 2898 2898 2898
***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1. Standard errors in
parentheses.
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As discussed in Section 4, there might exist some potential endogeneity bias
due to simultaneity between the dependent variable and its regressors. To
prove that our results are not driven by this aspect we perform an instru-
mental variable estimation, in which we tackle this issue. Specifically, we
apply a two stage least squares probit instrumental variable estimator as an
additional robustness check. Consequently, our potential endogenous vari-
ables – the variables on the financing conditions, the variable on the state of
the business and the variable on the change in the expectations of the firm –
are instrumented by their first lags. For all these instruments the first stage
regressions indicate that they are significant and strong instruments.15
The results of the second stage regressions are presented in Table 1.2. In
Column 1 we again can observe a clearly negative and significant effect of
worsening financing conditions on the innovative activity of firms, which is
in line with our previous findings. Furthermore, also the results of the es-
timations when including the two separate variables for above average and
below average financing conditions, presented in Columns 2-4, support and
even strengthen the findings of our preceding estimations. As before we find
that below average financing conditions restrict innovative activity, whereas
above average financing conditions do not foster it. In this context it is
worthwhile to note that the coefficients of the IV-estimator for our variables
“credit” and “creditdiff” are higher than in our baseline estimations, sug-
gesting an underestimation of the effects of worsening financing conditions
on the innovative activity of firms when not taking into account the aspect of
mutual causation. By this, our results support findings of previous literature
highlighting the reverse causality between credit restrictions and innovative
activity (Hajivassiliou and Savignac, 2007, Savignac, 2008).
15The results of the first stage regressions are available upon request.
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Table 1.2: Credit Constraints and Innovative Activity – Instrumental
Variable Probit Model
Innov – Binary IV Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
credit -0.297 ** - - -
(0.134)
creditdif - -0.430 ** - -0.494 **
(0.174) (0.213)
crediteas - - 0.002 -0.233
(0.384) (0.438)
expect 0.416 ** 0.393 ** 0.385 ** 0.389 **
(0.345) (0.166) (0.165) (0.166)
situat 0.485 0.157 0.309 ** 0.171
(0.271) (0.134) (0.130) (0.136)
mkp 1.094 0.875 0.778 0.865
(0.848) (0.588) (0.580) (0.590)
branch yes yes yes yes
region yes yes yes yes
time yes yes yes yes
exit yes yes yes yes
Log-Lik. -764.19 -1580.43 -1583.44 -1580.29
Observ. 1489 1489 1489 1489
***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1. Standard errors in
parentheses.
A further feature of our dataset is the possibility to distinguish between prod-
uct and process innovations. This allows to apply some additional robustness
checks by performing our analysis for the two kinds of innovative activity
separately. Specifically, we can examine if the previous results hold when
distinguishing between process and product innovations. Table 1.3 provides
the results of our random effects panel estimator for both kinds of innovative
activity. Table 1.4 provides the results of our two stage instrumental variable
estimator.16 As already mentioned in Section 4, when distinguishing between
the decision to start a product innovation and the decision to start a process
innovation, we have to consider in addition the possible simultaneity of the
16Again, also here the first stage regressions indicate our instruments are significant and
strong instruments. As before, the results of the first stage regressions are available upon
request.
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two decisions. Consequently, in Table 1.5 we provide the results when ap-
plying a bivariate probit estimator to account for the potential dependency
of the two decisions.
Columns 1-4 of each table provide the results regarding the probability to
start a product innovation project, Columns 5-8 of each table provide the
results regarding the probability to start a process innovation project. How-
ever, one can see that for both kinds of innovative activity the outcomes again
support our previous findings. All estimations show a clearly significant and
negative relationship between worsening financing conditions and the prob-
ability that the firm will start a product or process innovation project, re-
spectively. Moreover, the results again show that below average financing
conditions have a negative effect on the decisions to start product as well as
process innovation projects and that above average financing conditions do
not foster them, thereby supporting previous findings and conclusions.
Table 1.3: The Differentiation between Product- and Process Innovations –
Random Effects Panel Probit Model
Productinnov – Binary Panel Regression Processinnov – Binary Panel Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
credit -0.229 *** - - - -0.190 ** - - -
(0.076) (0.075)
creditdif - -0.244 *** - -0.233 *** - -0.187 ** - -0.165 *
(0.084) (0.085) (0.083) (0.085)
crediteas - - 0.145 0.080 - - 0.213 * 0.166
(0.122) (0.123) (0.121) (0.122)
expect 0.193 ** 0.200 ** 0.235 *** 0.196 ** 0.298 *** 0.306 *** 0.328 *** 0.299 ***
(0.085) (0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084) (0.083) (0.084)
situat 0.272 ** 0.275 ** 0.265 ** 0.273 ** 0.033 0.036 0.028 0.031
(0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.107) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105)
mkp 0.907 * 0.939 * 0.939 * 0.944 * 1.136 ** 1.159 ** 1.172 ** 1.171 **
(0.484) (0.483) (0.486) (0.483) (0.459) (0.459) (0.461) (0.460)
branch yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
region yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
exit yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Log-Lik. -1501.75 -1502.08 -1501.87 -1505.58 -1376.95 -1377.63 -1378.58 -1376.71
Observ. 2898 2898 2898 2898 2898 2898 2898 2898
***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 1.4: The Differentiation between Product- and Process Innovations –
Instrumental Variable Probit Model
Productinnov – Binary IV Regression Processinnov – Binary IV Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
credit -0.301 ** - - - -0.425 *** - - -
(0.146) (0.157)
creditdif - -0.457 ** - -0.448 ** - -0.591 *** - -0.669 ***
(0.177) (0.217) (0.190) (0.234)
crediteas - - 0.245 0.033 - - 0.032 -0.283
(0.386) (0.439) (0.422) (0.485)
expect 0.155 0.124 0.248 * 0.122 0.162 0.141 0.341 ** 0.155
(0.136) (0.136) (0.132) (0.139) (0.145) (0.146) (0.141) (0.148)
situat 0.297 ** 0.291 * 0.288 * 0.291 * 0.338 0.329 * 0.317 * 0.325 *
(0.168) (0.169) (0.168) (0.169) (0.180) (0.181) (0.179) (0.182)
mkp -0.156 -0.102 -0.151 -0.100 1.062 * 1.140 * 0.999 ** 1.136 *
(0.654) (0.658) (0.647) (0.659) (0.591) (0.596) (0.585) (0.600)
branch yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
region yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
exit yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observ. 1489 1489 1489 1489 1489 1489 1489 1489
***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 1.5: The Differentiation between Product- and Process Innovations –
Binary Bivariate Probit Model
Productinnov – Binary Bivariate Regression Procesinnov – Binary Bivariate Regression
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b)
credit -0.202 *** - - - -0.190 *** - - -
(0.051) (0.053)
creditdif - -0.234 *** - -0.231 *** - -0.222 *** - -0.215 ***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060)
crediteas - - 0.092 0.021 - - 0.114 0.049
(0.085) (0.087) (0.086) (0.088)
expect 0.149 *** 0.153 *** 0.196 *** 0.151 *** 0.236 *** 0.240 *** 0.278 *** 0.236 ***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057)
situat 0.228 *** 0.229 *** 0.224 *** 0.229 *** 0.081 0.081 0.078 0.081
(0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
mkp 0.740 ** 0.763 ** 0.763 ** 0.765 ** 0.826 *** 0.846 *** 0.849 *** 0.850 ***
(0.326) (0.329) (0.323) (0.329) (0.315) (0.312) (0.317) (0.312)
branch yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
region yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
time yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
exit yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Log-Lik. -2760.19 -2759.13 -2768.59 -2758.98 -2760.19 -2759.13 -2768.59 -2758.98
Observ. 2898 2898 2898 2898 2898 2898 2898 2898
***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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1.6 Summary and Conclusion
In this essay we have analysed the effects of financing conditions on the in-
novative activity of firms. In contrast to other literature we could use direct
measures for the innovative activity of the firms as well as for the financing
conditions the firms are facing, by this means avoiding problems of indirect
measures commonly applied as proxies for these two variables. Moreover,
the dataset provided the possibility to control for the business expectations
of a firm – due to the existence of forward-looking adjustments in a world
of expectations an important determinant of the innovative activity of the
firm. In addition, the characteristics of the dataset and the design of the sur-
vey questions allowed us to avoid endogeneity issues caused by unobserved
heterogeneity or mutual causation, which commonly are present in the liter-
ature. Finally, the possibility to differentiate between ”worse than average”
and “better than average” financing conditions allowed us to analyse poten-
tial asymmetries in the effects of below average and above average financing
conditions.
The results provided – as opposed to many other papers – strong evidence
that worsening financing conditions restrict the innovative activity of firms.
More interestingly, the results showed asymmetries in the effects of below
average and above average financing conditions. We found that below aver-
age financing conditions restrict innovative activity, whereas above average
financing conditions do not foster it. The novel second result on the exis-
tence of asymmetries has interesting implications. It gives strong evidence
for considerations raised in more recent literature that the individual inno-
vation capacity of a firm plays an important role for its innovative activity.
To additionally support our findings we have extended the usual theory of
innovation activity by rigidities with respect to a firm’s individual innovation
capacity, which leads to a differentiation between a long run and a short run
equilibrium in innovative output.
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Appendix
A Results of the Hausman Test
Table 1.6: Hausman Test – Baseline Specification with Dependent Variable
“Innov”
(b) (B) (b-B) (sqrt(diag(Vb − VB)))
(fixed effects) (random effects) (difference) (s.e.)
credit -0.019 -0.043 0.024 0.018
expect -0.006 0.040 -0.046 0.029
situat 0.058 0.066 -0.008 0.023
d 2004 -0.033 -0.030 -0.002 0.014
d 2005 -0.033 -0.021 -0.012 0.015
d 2006 -0.025 -0.036 0.011 0.018
d 2007 -0.030 -0.047 0.017 0.021
b = consistent under H0 and Ha; obtained from linear fixed effects panel estimator.
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under H0; obtained from linear random effects panel
estimator.
Test: H0: difference in coefficients not systematic
χ2(8) = (b−B)′[(Vb − VB)(−1)](b−B) = 6.44
Prob > χ2 = 0.5978
Table 1.7: Hausman Test – Baseline Specification with Dependent Variable
“Productinnov”
(b) (B) (b-B) (sqrt(diag(Vb − VB)))
(fixed effects) (random effects) (difference) (s.e.)
credit -0.023 -0.049 0.025 0.019
expect 0.010 0.054 -0.043 0.027
situat 0.027 0.041 -0.014 0.025
d 2004 -0.009 -0.010 0.001 0.013
d 2005 -0.002 -0.005 0.003 0.014
d 2006 -0.008 -0.025 0.017 0.018
d 2007 -0.014 -0.036 0.022 0.020
b = consistent under H0 and Ha; obtained from linear fixed effects panel estimator.
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under H0; obtained from linear random effects panel
estimator.
Test: H0: difference in coefficients not systematic
χ2(8) = (b−B)′[(Vb − VB)(−1)](b−B) = 7.05
Prob > χ2 = 0.5311
21
Table 1.8: Hausman Test – Baseline Specification with Dependent Variable
“Processinnov”
(b) (B) (b-B) (sqrt(diag(Vb − VB)))
(fixed effects) (random effects) (difference) (s.e.)
credit 0.009 -0.039 0.048 0.018
expect -0.026 0.004 -0.030 0.030
situat 0.040 0.058 -0.019 0.023
d 2004 -0.042 -0.045 0.003 0.012
d 2005 -0.043 -0.032 -0.011 0.014
d 2006 -0.030 -0.046 0.016 0.018
d 2007 -0.038 -0.068 0.030 0.017
b = consistent under H0 and Ha; obtained from linear fixed effects panel estimator.
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under H0; obtained from linear random effects panel
estimator.
Test: H0: difference in coefficients not systematic
χ2(8) = (b−B)′[(Vb − VB)(−1)](b−B) = 12.40
Prob > χ2 = 0.1342
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B Robustness Check – First Lag of Dependent
Variable as Additional Regressor
Table 1.9: Robustness Check – Lag of Dependent Variable Included as
Additional Regressor
Innov Productinnov Processinnov
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
credit -0.185 ** -0.202 ** - -0.212 ** -
(0.086) (0.090) (0.106)
creditdif - -0.234 ** - -0.240 ** - -0.200 *
(0.095) (0.099) (0.117)
crediteas - 0.025 - 0.013 - 0.168
(0.140) (0.144) (0.164)
expect 0.154 0.153 0.189 0.188 0.120 0.115
(0.116) (0.116) (0.122) (0.122) (0.145) (0.145)
situat 0.349 *** 0.345 *** 0.251 ** 0.251 ** 0.484 *** 0.481 ***
(0.095) (0.095) (0.097) (0.097) (0.119) (0.119)
mkp 1.539 *** 1.569 *** 0.925 * 0.963 * 0.820 0.851
(0.589) (0.589) (0.576) (0.574) (0.692) (0.692)
branch yes yes yes yes yes yes
region yes yes yes yes yes yes
time yes yes yes yes yes yes
exit yes yes yes yes yes yes
Log-Lik. -1013.20 -1012.28 -971.63 -971.09 -860.25 -859.92
Observ. 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999
Random effects probit model. + First lag of the dependent variable.
***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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C Robustness Check – Dataset without Cor-
rections
Table 1.10: Robustness Check – Use of the Initial Dataset without
Corrections
Innov Productinnov Processinnov
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
credit -0.199 ** - -0.236 *** - -0.188 ** -
(0.084) (0.085) (0.083)
creditdif - -0.199 ** - -0.221 ** - -0.160 *
(0.095) (0.095) (0.094)
crediteas - 0.119 - 0.165 - 0.189
(0.138) (0.137) (0.136)
expect 0.295 ** 0.294 ** 0.360 *** 0.360 *** 0.045 0.042
(0.120) (0.120) (0.122) (0.122) (0.118) (0.118)
situat 0.254 *** 0.253 *** 0.155 0.155 0.386 0.388
(0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.095) *** (0.095) ***
mkp -0.338 -0.322 -0.213 -0.197 0.038 0.053
(0.614) (0.613) (0.598) (0.597) (0.585) (0.584)
branch yes yes yes yes yes yes
region yes yes yes yes yes yes
time yes yes yes yes yes yes
exit yes yes yes yes yes yes
Log-Lik. -1544.69 -1544.46 -1481.58 -1481.36 -1396.41 -1395.99
Observ. 2898 2898 2898 2898 2898 2898
Random effects probit model. ***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Chapter 2
Product and Process
Innovations and Growth – New
Evidence from Firm Level
Panel Data
In theory, innovations are one of the main drivers of the competitiveness,
the growth of an economy, respectively. Accordingly, a huge literature exists
analysing the effects of innovative activity on growth in terms of export
shares, sales or employment. We contribute to this literature in several ways:
First, from a novel survey data set we are able to use direct information on
the competitive situation of the company, at the national as well as the
international level. Secondly, we are also able to use direct information on
the innovative activity of firms, by this avoiding issues of commonly applied
indirect measures like the level of investments in R&D or patents. Thirdly,
and most importantly, in our analysis we are able to differentiate between
product and process innovations, where until now only little research has
been done. The results show the major importance of innovative activity for
the competitive situation of firms. Moreover, the results show that product
innovations contribute to an improvement in the competitive situation of
firms, while process innovations obviously do not, thereby providing evidence
for the superior importance of non-price factors compared to price factors
with respect to competitiveness and growth.
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2.1 Introduction
At the micro level, competitiveness is generally defined as the ability of a
company to grow. In earlier literature, mainly price factors – e.g. cost reduc-
tions – were considered as determining the competitiveness of a firm. This
view was questioned by the publication of Kaldor (1978) along with the so
called Kaldor paradox. The Kaldor paradox describes the empirical finding
that countries which experience a significant increase in their labour costs
often concurrently experience an increase in their export shares. In light
of this, by using several measures for the growth of the companies, a huge
body of literature appeared, which considered non-price factors – especially
in terms of innovations – as important determinants of the competitiveness
of firms. In this framework, most prominent and vital branches of research
discuss the influence of innovative activity on export shares (see e.g. Ster-
lacchini, 1999, Roper and Love, 2002, Bleaney and Wakelin, 2002) or on the
level of employment (see e.g. Piva and Vivarelli, 2005, Bogliacino and Pianta,
2010, or Chennels and Van Reenen, 2002, for an overview).
In this essay we analyse the effects of innovative activity on the competitve-
ness, the growth of a firm, respectively. By doing so we are able to use
a novel measure of the competitiveness of the firm, obtained from a direct
question included in a large business survey in Germany. In addition, dif-
ferent to many other analyses we are able to use a direct measure of the
innovative activity of firms as well, thereby avoiding issues of indirect mea-
sures commonly applied, such as the level of investments in R&D or patents
(see Griliches, 1979, Hall et al., 2001, Becheikh et al., 2006). This allows for
the first time to analyse directly the relationship between innovative activity
and competitiveness. Moreover, from the data available we can differentiate
between the introduction of a product innovation and the introduction of a
process innovation, allowing for a more detailed analysis and avoiding certain
issues when targeting the aspect of non-price factors in terms of innovative
activity. Specifically, when analysing the effects of non-price factors in terms
of innovative activity, one has to consider that certain innovation projects
could also target cost reduction in the production process. As the dataset
allows the discrimination between product innovations, which by definition
target non-price competition – e.g. product differentiation – and process in-
novations, which by definition target price competition – e.g. cost reduction
– we can take this aspect into account.
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The results highlight the major importance of innovations for growth. By
using a direct measure of the competitive situation of a firm as well as for the
innovative activity of a firm we find a clearly significant and positive effect
of innovative activity – at the national as well as at the international level.
More importantly, when distinguishing between product and process innova-
tions we find that only the introduction of product innovations significantly
contributes to an improvement in the competitive situation of the firm, while
we cannot observe this for the introduction of process innovations. This re-
sult provides evidence that non-price factors indeed play a superior role for
competitiveness and growth compared with price factors.
Consequently, the remainder of the essay is organized as follows. Section
2 provides some information about the dataset. Section 3 describes our
empirical specification. Section 4 presents the estimation results. Section 5
concludes.
2.2 The Survey Data
To perform our analysis we use data from two sources: the Ifo Innovation
Survey and the Ifo Business Tendency Survey for German manufacturing
firms.1 In these datasets, the unit of observation for multi product firms
represents a single production entity for a single product of the firm rather
than the whole firm, thereby enabling a more detailed analysis than usual.
However, for the sake of simplicity, in the following we will refer to a unit of
observation as a “firm”. As the surveys include questions which are asked
on different frequencies, we will transform all variables used to the lowest
frequency (annual) if necessary.
2.2.1 Data from the Ifo Innovation Survey
The data on the innovative activity of the firm stem from the Ifo Innovation
Survey, which is conducted annually. Specifically, the survey asks at the be-
1Both datasets are provided by the Economics & Business Data Center (EBDC), a
combined platform for empirical research in business administration and economics of
the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) and the Ifo Institute for Economic
Research.
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ginning of each year, whether the firm has introduced an innovation in the
preceding year. Innovations are categorized in product and process innova-
tions. The resulting variables are the variable “prodinnov”, which is coded
1, if a product innovation was introduced in the preceding year, and 0 other-
wise, and the variable “procinnov”, which is coded 1, if a process innovation
was introduced in the preceding year, and 0 otherwise.2
Table 2.1 provides some descriptive statistics, which will be of importance
in the following for some robustness checks. The first two rows present the
frequencies of the outcomes of the variables “prodinnov” and “procinnov” de-
scribed above. The last 4 rows present the joint frequencies of the variables
“prodinnov” and “procinnov”. In particular, row 3 provides the frequency
for the situation in which product and process innovations were introduced
contemporarily (“prod- and procinnov”). Row 4 and row 5 provide the fre-
quencies for the situation in which only a product innovation (“prodinnov
only”), and the situation in which only a process innovation (“procinnov
only”) was introduced. Row 6 shows the frequency for the situation in which
no innovation at all was introduced (“noinnov”).
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics – Innovation Variables
yes (1) no (0) total
Unconditional prodinnov 3131 4266 7397
Frequencies (42.33 %) (57.67 %) (100.00 %)
procinnov 2248 5149 7397
(30.39 %) (69.61 %) (100.00 %)
Conditional prod- and procinnov 1788 5609 7397
(Joint) (24.17 %) (75.83 %) (100.00 %)
Frequencies prodinnov only 1343 6054 7397
(18.16 %) (81.84 %) (100.00 %)
procinnov only 460 6937 7397
(6.22 %) (93.78 %) (100.00 %)
noinnov 3806 3591 7397
(51.45 %) (48.55 %) (100.00 %)
7397 -
(100.00 %)
2The possibility that there exist multiple product or process innovations at the same
time is mostly prevented by the fact that each ID-number of the dataset represents a single
production entity for a single product of the firm rather than the whole firm.
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2.2.2 Data from the Ifo Business Tendency Survey
The data on the competitive situation of the firm stem from the monthly
Ifo business tendency service and are included in the survey quarterly. The
survey asks about the change in the competitive situation of the firm at
the national level as well as at the European level (excluding the domestic
market). For the remainder of the essay we will refer to the latter as the
”international level”. The answers are coded as +1 (“competitive situation
improved over the last 3 months”), 0 (“competitive situation remained con-
stant over the last 3 months”), and -1 (“competitive situation worsened over
the last 3 months”). These data are aggregated on a yearly basis by taking
the averages of the values of the variables over the year. The variables result-
ing from this can be interpreted as measures of the change in the competitive
situation of the firm at the national level over the year (“compet-nat”) and of
the change in the competitive situation of the firm at the international level
over the year (“compet-int”). They can take values between +1 and -1, where
the limit value of +1 indicates that the firm reported an improvement of the
competitive situation at the national/international level in every quarter of
the year. Correspondingly, the limit value of -1 indicates that the firm re-
ported a worsening in the competitive situation at the national/international
level in every quarter of the year.
Furthermore, the Ifo business tendency service consists of a question on the
overall business situation of the firm. The answers to this question are coded
as -1 (“unfavourable business situation”), 0 (“normal business situation”),
and +1 (“good business situation”). Similarly to the question on the com-
petitive situation of the firm, the question on the business situation of the
firm is asked several times during the year (every month). Accordingly, this
variable also has to be aggregated on a yearly basis. We do this again by
taking the average of the values of the variable of the single months. The
resulting variable “situat” can be interpreted as the average business situa-
tion over the year. In addition, to control for the overall demand situation
of the firm, we use survey questions asking for the change of the demand
situation as well as the order situation of the company. The answers to these
question are coded as -1 (“worse”), 0 (“equal”), and +1 (“better”). As both
variables are asked by the survey on a monthly basis we transform them on
a yearly basis in the way already described. The resulting variables can be
interpreted as measures of the change in the demand situation of the firm
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over the year (“demand”) and the change in the number of orders of the firm
over the year (“orders”), respectively.
Finally, the business tendency survey provides information on certain firm
characteristics. First of all, we can relate to the size of a company in terms
of its number of employees. Specifically, this is done by generating the vari-
able “size”, which is the natural logarithm of the number of employees of
the firm. In addition, each firm is allocated to one of the following 14 man-
ufacturing subsectors: Food, Beverages and Tobacco; Textiles and Textile
Products; Tanning and Dressing of Leather; Cork and Wood Products ex-
cept Furniture; Pulp, Paper, Publishing and Printing; Refined Petroleum
Products; Chemicals and Chemical Products; Rubber and Plastic Products;
Other Non-metallic Mineral Products; Basic and Fabricated Metal Products;
Machinery and Equipment; Electrical and Optical Equipment; Transport
Equipment; Furniture, Manufacture. Furthermore, each firm is allocated to
one of the following regions in Germany: East Germany, West Germany,
South Germany and North Germany.
We use data for the period from 1994 to 2007. The dataset is organized as
an unbalanced panel, and the total number of observations is about 7400. A
detailed overview of the questionnaire and the survey variables can be found
in Becker and Wohlrabe (2008).
2.3 Empirical Specification
To analyse the possible effects of innovative activity on the competitive sit-
uation of the firms we specify the baseline model as
yit = αit + β1innovit + β2situatit + β3demandit + β4ordersit+
+β5sizeit + β6exitit + β7Bit + β8Lit + β9Tit + uit,
where yit is the variable representing the competitive situation of firm i at
time t.
In a first specification, our explanatory variable of interest is the variable
“innov”. This variable is a dummy variable, which equals 1, if firm i has
introduced a product or process innovation at time t, and 0 otherwise. In
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a second specification we distinguish between product and process innova-
tions. Specifically, we replace the variable “innov” by two variables, where
one variable represents the introduction of a product innovation, and the
other variable represents the introduction of a process innovation. Accord-
ingly, we include the dummy variable “prodinnov”, which equals 1, if firm
i has introduced a product innovation at time t, and 0 otherwise, and the
dummy variable “procinnov”, which equals 1, if firm i has introduced a pro-
cess innovation at time t, and 0 otherwise. It is important to note that these
innovation variables are included in the model contemporaneously. This is
reasonable as technological adoption and progress at the national as well as
the international level are so fast in most industries that innovations will be
imitated very immediately or will even be obsolete within one year, as claimed
in Lachenmaier and Woessmann (2006). Consequently, the introduction of
an innovation will influence the competitive situation in the current year, but
not the one in the following year.
Furthermore, we include the variable “situat” to control for the overall busi-
ness situation of the firm. By introducing this variable we aim to cap-
ture both the overall macroeconomic developments and firm-specific develop-
ments, which could influence the judgement of the firm concerning its current
competitive situation. The higher the value of the variable, the better was
the business situation over the year. As with the innovation variables, the
variable “situat” is included contemporaneously. This is reasonable as the
judgement concerning the change of the competitive situation of the firm
naturally is linked to the current rather than to the past business situation
of the firm. Moreover, we include two measures for the demand situation
of the firm. Specifically, we include our variable “demand”, which captures
the current demand situation of the firm, and our variable “orders”, which
captures the future prospects of the demand situation of the firm. As the
variable on the business situation of the firm, the two demand variables are
included contemporaneously for the same reasons. Finally, we include the
variable “size”, which represents the size of the firm in terms of its number
of employees, expressed in natural logarithms. By this we take into account
potential different developments of bigger and smaller firms with respect to
their competitive situation.
In addition, we control for certain other firm characteristics. To account
for heterogeneous developments of the particular branches we include vector
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Bit, a set of 13 dummy variables which indicate the affiliation of the firm
to a specific branch.3 For similar reasons – heterogeneous developments of
different regions – we include a further set of dummy variables, represented
by vector Lit, which consists of 3 dummy variables indicating the region the
company is allocated to.4 Lastly, we introduce vector Tit, which consists of
13 time dummies representing the years 1995 to 2007, to pay attention to
possible changes of innovative behaviour over time due to major technological
or structural developments.5
Finally, we have to address a potential sample selection bias due to attrition,6
as some companies initially included in the surveys were discharged over
time. Main reasons for discharging usually are that the company is no longer
interested in taking part in the survey, that the company was taken over by
another firm or that the company went bankrupt. If the exit of the companies
is not random and there exist some common underlying reasons that the
companies left the survey – e.g. bad overall performance – there could be
some source of sample selection bias in our estimations. In order to ease this
problem we include the dummy variable “exit”, which indicates whether a
firm has left the survey over the period of the analysis, thereby capturing
firm-specific common characteristics of the firms which were discharged from
the survey (see Smolny, 1996).
In a first analysis we use a linear panel estimator. In this context one has
to note that the design of the questions in our survey is such that by their
nature firm fixed effects are eliminated.7 This leaves αit, representing the
firm-specific effects, and our independent variables uncorrelated and leads us
in a first regression to the use of a random effects model. However, to take
into account potential dynamics of the model and to picture persistences
3The baseline branch is the sector “Machinery and Equipment”.
4The baseline region is North Germany.
5The baseline year is the year 1994.
6See Heckman (1979), Smolny (1998).
7The survey asks for the business situation of the firm compared to its normal firm-
specific level, which by definition eliminates the firm fixed effects with respect to this vari-
able. Furthermore, the survey asks for the change of the demand and the order situation
of the firm on an ordinal scale, which also rules out any firm fixed effects concerning these
variables. Similarly, our innovation variable, representing the timing of the introduction
of an innovation (and measured on a nominal scale), is also not affected by firm-specific
characteristics.
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possibly existent with respect to our dependent variable we provide an addi-
tional robustness check by introducing the first lag of our response variable
as additional regressor (see Appendix A).
In a second analysis we try to rule out the possibility that our results are
driven by a potential endogeneity bias due to simultaneity between the de-
pendent variable and its regressors. For example, it might be possible not
only that the introduction of an innovation influences the competitive situa-
tion of the firms, but also that the competitive situation influences the timing
of the introduction of an innovation. Similarly, the business as well as the
demand situation might have an effect on the judgement of the firm about
its current competitive situation, but the competitive situation highly likely
also influences the business and the demand situation of the firm. We can
control for this issue by using the panel structure of our dataset. Specifically,
we can apply a random effects instrumental variable panel estimator, which
allows us to instrument our explanatory variables by their first lags and so
to take into account the potential simultaneity problem.
In this context it also might be of interest, in what direction, if any, the
coefficients of the variables of concern – our innovation variables – are biased
without considering the endogeneity issue due to mutual causation. For ex-
ample, one might argue that an increase in innovative activity will improve
competitiveness, and vice versa, improved competitiveness will have a posi-
tive effect on decision of the company to innovate. This could be the case if
the improved competitive situation enables the firms to perform additional
innovation projects which otherwise would not have been undertaken, and
will lead to an overestimation of the effects of innovations on competitiveness
when using standard estimators. Others then might argue that an increase
in the innovative activity will improve competitiveness, but that improved
competitiveness will have a negative effect on the decision of the firm to in-
novate. This could be the case if the marginal return from new innovations
decreases with the level of competitiveness, thereby decreasing the incentive
of the firms to decide further innovations, and will lead to an underestima-
tion of the effects of innovations on competitiveness when using standard
estimators.
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Finally, as an additional robustness check we apply a random effects panel
tobit estimator to take into account that our dependent variable is censored
at an upper bound of 1 and a lower bound of -1.
2.4 The Estimation Results
2.4.1 Baseline Regressions
Table 2.2 provides the results of our baseline estimations using a linear ran-
dom effects panel estimator. It shows how innovative activity influences the
competitive situation of a firm.
Table 2.2: Competitive Situation on the
National Level – Baseline Regressions
Linear Panel Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
innov 0.032 *** 0.030 *** - -
(0.008) (0.008)
prodinnov - - 0.039 *** 0.036 ***
(0.009) (0.009)
procinnov - - -0.001 -0.001
(0.009) (0.009)
situat 0.147 *** 0.143 *** 0.147 *** 0.143 ***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
demand 0.259 *** 0.261 *** 0.258 *** 0.261 ***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
orders 0.088 *** 0.083 *** 0.087 *** 0.082 ***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
size 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
branch yes no yes no
region yes no yes no
time yes no yes no
exit yes no yes no
Observ. 7397 7397 7397 7397
***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1. Standard errors in
parentheses.
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Columns 1 and 2 provide the results when analysing the effects of the intro-
duction of any innovation – process or product. As one can see in Column 1,
the introduction of an innovation leads to a clearly significant improvement
in the competitive situation of the firm. The estimation results shown in
Column 2 indicate that this finding is not caused by the introduction of the
several dummy variables.
More interestingly, Columns 3 and 4 provide the results of our estimations
when differentiating between the introduction of a product innovation and
the introduction of a process innovation. As one can see in Column 3, the
positive effect of innovative activity on the competitive situation of the firms
identified in our preceding estimations seems only to be driven by the in-
troduction of product innovations. While the effect of an introduction of a
product innovation is clearly significant and positive, the effect of the intro-
duction of a process innovation is greatly insignificant and de facto close to
zero. Again, the empirical outcomes are not caused by the introduction of
the dummy variables, as shown in Column 4.8
2.4.2 Robustness Checks
As already stated in Section 3, there exists the possibility of endogeneity
between the dependent variable and its regressors due to mutual causation.
To control for this potential issue we perform a robustness check by apply-
ing a linear random effects instrumental variable panel estimator. Specif-
ically, we instrument the potential endogenous variables “innov”, “prodin-
nov”, “procinnov”, “situat”, “demand” and “orders” by their first lags. For
all these instruments the first stage regressions indicate that they are signif-
icant and strong instruments.9 The results of the second stage regressions,
presented in Columns 1-3 of Table 2.3, support the findings of our preced-
ing estimations. Column 1 again provides evidence that an introduction of
any innovation, product or process, improves the competitive situation of the
company significantly. Columns 2 and 3 then show that the preceding result
8Furthermore, it is worth to mention that the coefficient of the dummy variable “exit”
is not significantly different from zero and excluding the variable barely alters the results
(results available upon request). This indicates that the problem of attrition is not present
in this dataset for our specification.
9Results of the first stage regressions are available upon request.
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is driven only by the positive and significant effect of product innovations.
Note that the coefficients regarding the effect of innovative activity on com-
petitiveness compared with the ones of the standard estimations increase,
considering an underestimation of the effects without taking into account
the endogeneity due to reverse causality. This obviously implies some nega-
tive causal effect of an improvement in competitiveness on the decision of the
firms to innovate. As already stated, such an outcome could be explained
by diminishing marginal returns from innovations with the improvement of
the firms’ competitiveness, their market power obtained by innovations, re-
spectively, which decreases the incentive of the firms to implement further
innovations.
Table 2.3: Competitive Situation on the
National Level – Robustness Checks (1)
Linear IV Panel Regression Panel Tobit Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
innov 0.093 *** - - 0.035 *** - -
(0.016) (0.008)
prodinnov - 0.079 *** 0.070 *** - 0.041 *** 0.038 ***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009)
procinnov - 0.010 0.016 - 0.000 0.000
(0.022) (0.021) (0.009) (0.009)
situat 0.099 *** 0.091 *** 0.096 *** 0.152 *** 0.152 *** 0.147 ***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
demand 0.373 *** 0.411 *** 0.417 *** 0.273 *** 0.274 *** 0.276 ***
(0.050) (0.044) (0.044) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
orders 0.130 ** 0.114 ** 0.109 ** 0.090 *** 0.090 *** 0.084 ***
(0.053) (0.047) (0.046) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
size 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
branch yes yes no yes yes no
region yes yes no yes yes no
time yes yes no yes yes no
exit yes yes no yes yes no
Observ. 5099 5099 5099 7397 7397 7397
***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Moreover, we have to take into account that our dependent variable is cen-
sored at an upper bound of 1 and a lower bound of -1. We do this by
applying a random effects panel tobit estimator as an additional robustness
check. However, the corresponding results presented in Columns 4-6 of Table
2.3 are in line with our previous findings. Specifically, the coefficients esti-
mated differ only slightly from our baseline estimation results of the linear
random effects panel estimator (see Table 2.2).
Until now, we have analysed solely the effects of innovative activity on the
domestic competitiveness of firms. However, as outlined in Section 2 of this
chapter, the survey data also provides the possibility of performing an anal-
ysis of the effects of innovative activity on the international competitiveness.
We use this possibility to apply an additional robustness check. Specifically,
we now regress the variable measuring the change of the competitive situation
at the international level on our innovation measures and our control vari-
ables. The analysis is performed by again applying a linear random effects
panel estimator as baseline estimator, a linear random effects instrumental
variable estimator to tackle the aspect of endogeneity and a random effects
tobit panel estimator to take into account that our dependent variable is
censored at an upper bound of 1 and a lower bound of -1.
The results of the corresponding estimations are provided in Table 2.4. From
this table, one can see that the implications of our previous analyses at the
national level also hold at the international level. We can observe evidence
that innovative activity improves the competitive situation of the firms also
at the international level (see Columns 1, 3 and 5), and that this improve-
ment again is caused solely by the introduction of product innovations (see
Columns 2, 4 and 6). Moreover, and more interestingly, the results do not
change significantly even at the quantitative level. For all estimators, the
coefficients of the estimations for the effects of innovative activity on the
national competitiveness (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3) and for the effects of in-
novative activity on the international competitiveness (see Table 2.4) differ
only slightly, implying that domestic and international competitiveness are
affected by innovative activity in the same way and to the same extent.
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Table 2.4: Competitive Situation on the
International Level – Robustness Checks (2)
Linear Panel Regression Linear IV Panel Regression Panel Tobit Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
innov 0.026 *** - 0.098 *** - 0.029 *** -
(0.010) (0.022) (0.010)
prodinnov - 0.033 *** - 0.130 *** - 0.036 ***
(0.011) (0.030) (0.011)
procinnov - 0.006 - -0.043 - 0.007
(0.010) (0.035) (0.010)
situat 0.094 *** 0.094 *** 0.097 *** 0.103 *** 0.098 *** 0.097 ***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.021) (0.011) (0.011)
demand 0.155 *** 0.154 *** 0.260 *** 0.256 *** 0.164 *** 0.163 ***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.070) (0.073) (0.023) (0.023)
orders 0.100 *** 0.100 *** 0.229 *** 0.226 *** 0.109 *** 0.109 ***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.074) (0.076) (0.022) (0.022)
size 0.016 *** 0.015 *** 0.008 0.008 0.018 *** 0.017 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
branch yes yes yes yes yes yes
region yes yes yes yes yes yes
time yes yes yes yes yes yes
exit yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observ. 5723 5723 3974 3974 5723 5723
***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
Finally we apply a robustness check concerning the model specification. Un-
til now, we only took into account the effects of the introduction of product
and process innovations in isolation, neglecting possible interaction effects
regarding these two innovative activities. Potential interaction effects might
be of importance as concurrent introductions of product and process innova-
tions could generate externalities and by this could enhance or dampen the
effects of the particular innovations. Moreover, from rows 3-6 of Table 2.1,
which present the joint frequency distribution of the outcomes of the inno-
vation variables, one can see that such concurrent introductions of product
and process innovations took place quite often. Specifically, a concurrent in-
troduction of product and process innovations occurred in 24.17 % of cases,
while an introduction of a product innovation without the concurrent in-
troduction of a process innovation took place in only 18.16 % of cases. An
introduction of a process innovation without the concurrent introduction of a
product innovation even took place in only 6.22 % of cases. Consequently, we
additionally introduce the interaction variable “prod*proc”, which is coded
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1, if the introduction of product and process innovations took place contem-
porarily, and 0 otherwise.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present the results for the effects of innovative activity
on the competitiveness of firms when introducing the variable “prod*proc”.
Table 2.5 thereby is referring to the competitiveness of the firms at the na-
tional level. Table 2.6 is referring to the competitiveness of the firms at the
international level. However, one again can observe that the results don’t
change significantly from our previous findings. Moreover, the coefficients
of the interaction effects are mainly insignificant, by this giving no support
to the thesis of positive or negative externalities or interaction effects of the
concurrent introduction of product and process innovations.
Table 2.5: Competitive Situation on the
National Level – Robustness Checks (3)
Linear Panel Regression Linear IV Panel Regression Panel Tobit Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
prodinnov 0.041 *** 0.038 *** 0.106 *** 0.104 *** 0.043 *** 0.041 ***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.024) (0.024) (0.011) (0.011)
procinnov 0.003 0.004 0.082 * 0.112 ** 0.005 0.006
(0.015) (0.014) (0.045) (0.046) (0.015) (0.015)
prod*proc -0.007 -0.008 -0.103 ** -0.135 ** -0.008 -0.009
(0.019) (0.018) (0.052) 0.054 (0.019) 0.019
situat 0.147 *** 0.143 *** 0.100 *** 0.108 *** 0.152 *** 0.147 ***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009)
demand 0.258 *** 0.261 *** 0.370 *** 0.364 *** 0.273 *** 0.276 ***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.050) (0.051) (0.019) (0.019)
orders 0.087 *** 0.082 *** 0.133 ** 0.135 *** 0.090 *** 0.084 ***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.053) (0.054) (0.019) (0.019)
size 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
branch yes no yes no yes no
region yes no yes no yes no
time yes no yes no yes no
exit yes no yes no yes no
Observ. 7397 7397 5099 5099 7397 7397
***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.6: Competitive Situation on the
International Level – Robustness Checks (4)
Linear Panel Regression Linear IV Panel Regression Panel Tobit Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
prodinnov 0.027 ** 0.028 ** 0.129 *** 0.142 *** 0.029 ** 0.032 **
(0.012) 0.012 (0.027) (0.024) (0.012) (0.012)
procinnov -0.009 -0.012 -0.023 -0.026 -0.010 -0.013
(0.019) (0.019) (0.050) (0.047) 0.018 (0.018)
prod*proc 0.023 0.042 *** -0.020 -0.022 0.025 0.028
(0.022) (0.012) (0.057) (0.054) 0.022 (0.022)
situat 0.094 *** 0.098 *** 0.086 *** 0.089 *** 0.097 *** 0.101 ***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010)
demand 0.154 *** 0.151 *** 0.300 *** 0.306 *** 0.163 *** 0.160 ***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.058) (0.055) (0.023) (0.022)
orders 0.100 *** 0.101 *** 0.224 *** 0.220 *** 0.109 *** 0.110 ***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.061) (0.058) (0.022) (0.022)
size 0.015 *** 0.016 *** 0.009 ** 0.009 ** 0.017 *** 0.017 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
branch yes no yes no yes no
region yes no yes no yes no
time yes no yes no yes no
exit yes no yes no yes no
Observ. 5723 5723 3974 3974 5723 5723
***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
2.5 Conclusion
This essay has analysed the effects of innovative activity on the competitive-
ness of firms. In this framework we were able to use a direct measure of the
competitive situation of the firms, at the national and the international level,
as well as a direct measure of the innovative activity of the firms, thereby
avoiding issues of indirect measures commonly applied. Moreover, the pos-
sibility of differentiating between the introduction of a product innovation
and the introduction of a process innovation allowed us to perform a more
detailed analysis and so to contribute to the discussion of the importance of
price and non-price factors for the competitive situation of firms.
The results of the analysis have highlighted the great relevance of innova-
tive activity as determinant of economic growth. Moreover, the analysis has
shown that only product innovations significantly foster the competitive sit-
40
uation of a firm, while process innovations obviously do not. This finding
also contributes to the discussion about the Kaldor Paradox and related lit-
erature, which highlights the superior role of non-price factors compared to
price factors for the competitiveness of firms.
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Appendix
A Robustness Check – First Lag of Dependent
Variable as Additional Regressor
Table 2.7: Competitive Situation on the
National Level – Lag of Dependent Variable Included as Additional
Regressor
Linear Panel Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
innov 0.023 *** 0.024 *** - -
(0.008) (0.008)
prodinnov - - 0.026 *** 0.026 ***
(0.010) (0.010)
procinnov - - -0.001 -0.002
(0.010) (0.010)
situat 0.102 *** 0.101 *** 0.102 *** 0.101 ***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
demand 0.236 *** 0.241 *** 0.236 *** 0.242 ***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026)
orders 0.104 *** 0.099 *** 0.103 *** 0.098 ***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025)
size 0.006 * 0.005 0.006 * 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
branch yes no yes no
region yes no yes no
time yes no yes no
exit yes no yes no
Observ. 5046 5046 5046 5046
+ first lag of dependent variable; ***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.8: Competitive Situation on the
International Level – Lag of Dependent Variable Included as Additional
Regressor
Linear Panel Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
innov 0.021 ** 0.025 ** - -
(0.008) (0.010)
prodinnov - - 0.027 ** 0.035 ***
(0.011) (0.011)
procinnov - - -0.001 -0.005
(0.011) (0.011)
situat 0.071 *** 0.073 *** 0.071 *** 0.073 ***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
demand 0.171 *** 0.172 *** 0.171 *** 0.172 ***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
orders 0.108 *** 0.107 *** 0.107 *** 0.107 ***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
size 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
branch yes no yes no
region yes no yes no
time yes no yes no
exit yes no yes no
Observ. 3825 3825 3825 3825
+ first lag of dependent variable; ***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Chapter 3
How Strongly Did the 2007/08
Oil Price Hike Contribute to
the Subsequent Recession?
In this chapter we challenge the view that the oil price has lost its influence on
economic activity after the mid-1980s. While we concede that typical VAR
models put forward in the literature fail to identify oil price shocks that
significantly affect aggregate production, we obtain clearly negative output
and positive producer price effects of oil price hikes in a firm level analysis
for which we exploit a unique microeconomic dataset for Germany. Inspired
by this finding, we aggregate the firm level information into a single indicator
that signals in which periods the German economy was in a supply regime,
i.e., in a situation when prices and production moved in opposite directions.
Concentrating an otherwise standard VAR based search on these periods, we
are able to identify an oil price shock that affects the German production
even on the aggregate level. In a counterfactual analysis we show that the
2007/08 oil price hike contributed notably to the subsequent recession in
Germany even though it was by far not the main driver.
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3.1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom says that the worldwide recession of the years 2008/09
was driven by the downturn of the real estate market in the United States and
the following crisis of the banking sector, which peaked with the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. However, some voices argue that
other reasons significantly contributed to the recession as well. The preceding
oil price hike reaching 145 USD per barrel at the beginning of July 20081 is
an often cited candidate. Hamilton (2009) even argues that in the absence of
the high oil price perhaps no recession had occurred. This statement is con-
troversial. Recent literature suggests that the effects of oil price changes on
the economy decreased or even vanished over the last 30 years. Specifically,
many authors find that a structural break in the oil price-macroeconomy
relationship occurred during the first half of the 1980’s. For the time there-
after it seems difficult to identify effects of the oil price on the macroeconomy
by using standard VAR approaches (Herrera and Pesavento, 2007, Hooker,
2002). For the G-7 countries Blanchard and Gali (2008) conclude that the
oil price has lost its influence on the production level since 1983. They ar-
gue that this finding can be explained by more flexible labor markets, more
credible monetary policy and a smaller share of oil in the production process.
As a major drawback, many of the results in the literature are based on the
assumption that oil price changes are caused by only one single structural
shock which is thus very general and difficult to interpret. Kilian (2008)
tackles this problem by decomposing oil price changes into demand and sup-
ply driven shocks. By comparing seven major industrialized economies he
shows that exogenous oil supply shocks can trigger economic downswings,
yet the magnitude of the effects differs from country to country. More re-
cently, Kilian (2009) decomposes oil price surprises into three components,
namely, world economic demand, world supply of oil and precautionary de-
mand for oil, which captures market concerns about the availability of future
oil supply. His central conclusion is that only supply driven oil price shocks
and precautionary demand shocks have negative effects on macroeconomic
aggregates, while a mainly demand driven shock itself does not affect the
economy. Concerning the last recession, from the results of Kilian (2009)
one could conclude that the oil price increase during 2008 did not contribute
1See US Energy Information Administration (EIA).
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to the crisis, since the preceding oil price increase was mainly caused by world
demand. In contrast, Hamilton (2009) argues that the oil price increase in
2008, although being driven by increasing world demand, affected most coun-
tries much like a supply driven shock because the additional world demand
mainly was originated by one single country, China, and that this single
country took so much of the oil supply that the other countries experienced
this as a supply shock. A further issue pointed out by Hamilton (1996, 2003)
is the possible existence of asymmetries in the effects of oil price shocks. He
argues that oil price hikes give rise to recessions, whereas oil price decreases
do not affect macroeconomic activity to the same magnitude. Moreover, oil
price increases may be much less harmful to the macroeconomy if they simply
correct preceding decreases.
Against this background, this essay has two aims. First, it contributes to
the economic debate whether the oil price has lost its influence on aggregate
activity since the mid-1980s as argued by Hooker (2002), Herrera and Pe-
savento (2007), and Blanchard and Gali (2008). Second, it re-assesses how
important the 2007/08 oil price hike was as a cause for the subsequent reces-
sion, thereby adding to the research of Hamilton (2009) and Kilian (2009).
The idea of the essay is to augment an otherwise standard macroeconomic
VAR model with information from the firm level and use this to identify an
oil price shock that leads to a slump in production and an increase in the
general price level, and can thus be termed a “classical” oil supply shock.
We concentrate on the German economy as for the German manufacturing
sector there exists a unique firm level dataset which allows us to implement
our combined macro-micro perspective.
We start our analysis by applying various VAR approaches suggested in the
literature to identify oil price shocks hitting the German economy. It turns
out that it is hardly possible to detect any recessionary tendencies after such
a shock. This finding is in line with the results of an important branch of
literature on the subject and seems to confirm that the oil price has lost its
influence on the macroeconomy. However, the identification of an oil supply
shock is difficult and quite controversial, see Kilian and Murphy (2010). In
particular, to convincingly disentangle oil supply from, say, world demand
shocks, it is necessary to control for all exogenous demand shifts that affect
the oil price. Since the relationship between world demand and oil prices
is anything but certain, this amounts to a challenging task. By exploiting
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a novel microeconomic panel dataset that comprises monthly business sur-
vey results for the German manufacturing sector we can alleviate this issue.
Controlling for demand developments on the firm level we obtain significant
and intuitive direct effects of oil price changes on production and prices.
In addition, we find that demand side effects are strong and may thus ob-
scure the negative effects of oil price hikes in aggregate models. Inspired by
these results, we aggregate the firm level data into an indicator that signals
whether the German economy was in what we call a supply regime, i.e., in
a situation when prices and production moved into opposite directions. We
then take up our VAR analysis but this time concentrate on supply regime
periods. It turns out that this is sufficient to identify an oil supply shock
with intuitive and statistically significant effects even on the aggregate level.
In a counterfactual analysis we show that these effects are also economically
significant.
The remainder of the essay is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an
analysis on the macro level using different approaches from the literature to
examine the effects of oil prices changes on German production. In Section
3 we estimate the effect of oil price changes on production and prices at the
firm level. In Section 4 we augment an otherwise standard VAR model with
the supply regime indicator and find a significantly negative effect of oil price
hikes that is robust to a large number of model variations. In Section 5 we
ask whether the German economy would have avoided the recent recession if
the preceding oil price hikes had not occurred. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Standard Approaches to Identify the Ef-
fects of Oil Price Shocks on the German
Economy
In this section we apply several standard approaches put forward in the
literature to identify the effects of oil price shocks on the German economy.
In the first step we modify the VAR model for Germany of Peersman and
Smets (2003) in a way that allows us to study the effects of oil price changes.
The main drawback of this baseline model is that it only allows for a single,
and thus very general, oil price shock. In the second step, we therefore
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integrate a model of the world oil market in the line of Kilian (2009) – which
identifies one supply-specific and two demand-specific oil price shocks – with
the German VAR model. To ensure that the results do not depend on a
single identification strategy, we use both a Cholesky decomposition as in
Kilian (2009) and the sign restriction approach suggested by Peersman and
Van Robays (2009).
3.2.1 The Baseline Model
Our baseline model is a variant of the well-known VAR model for Germany
of Peersman and Smets (2003). Unlike them, we specify it with monthly
variables and include the nominal oil price instead of a world commodity
price index. The model is
Yt = B(L)Xt + A(L)Yt−1 + ut, (3.1)
where Yt denotes the vector of endogenous variables and consists of the nom-
inal WTI oil price in euros2, the German industrial production, the German
producer price index, the three-month Euribor3 and an indicator for Ger-
man price competitiveness.4 The vector Xt defines the exogenous variables,
which are included to control for changes in world demand. It contains US
industrial production and the effective Fed funds rate.
We estimate the VAR model in levels using monthly data over the period from
January 1980 to February 2009. The sample is chosen to be consistent with
our subsequent analysis of a microeconomic dataset which is only available
for this time period. As proposed by Peersman and Smets (2003) the VAR
features a constant and a time trend, and all variables are seasonally adjusted
2 We use the nominal rather than the real oil price for the following reason. Deflating
the oil price with a German price index leads to an endogeneity problem, as the price index
is affected by domestic variables which violates our assumption of a recursive structure in
the following Cholesky decomposition, see Fukunaga, Hirakata and Sudo (2010) and the
references therein for a discussion.
3Before 1999 we use the Fibor as short term interest rate instead of the Euribor.
4The indicator for price competitiveness is taken from the Deutsche Bundesbank. It is
based on exchange rates and consumer price indices against 23 selected industrial countries
and thus can be interpreted as a real effective exchange rate.
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and expressed in natural logarithms, except for the nominal interest rate.
The model is estimated as a subset VAR, i.e., we impose the restriction that
the oil price only depends on its own lags, a constant, a time trend and the
variables summarized in Xt. The VAR model contains 12 lags.
5
Figure 3.1: Impulse Responses to an Oil Price Shock in the Baseline Model
(68-, 90- and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals)
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The oil price shock is identified by applying the Cholesky decomposition,
where the oil price is placed first to allow it to influence all German vari-
ables contemporaneously. For the remaining variables we choose the follow-
ing ordering: industrial production, producer price index, Euribor and price
competitiveness.6
The estimated impulse responses together with 68, 90 and 95 percent confi-
5The qualitative results do not depend on the choice of the lag order.
6Changing the ordering of the unrestricted variables in the Cholesky decomposition
does not greatly alter our results.
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dence bands computed by means of the Hall bootstrap procedure are shown
in Figure 3.1. After an oil price shock, which brings about a price increase for
oil of roughly 8 percent on impact, we observe a significant positive reaction
of the producer prices. The impulse response function has a hump shape
pattern and reaches its peak after 12 months. The nominal interest rate
rises as well. However, the response is weak and becomes insignificant after
6 months. Surprisingly, industrial production expands in the first 6 months
after the shock even if not highly significantly so. Only after one year the
reaction becomes negative, but it remains insignificant. Hence, we obtain
the counterintuitive result that an oil price hike has expansionary short-term
effects and only mildly contractionary medium-term effects.
3.2.2 The Kilian Type VAR Model with Cholesky De-
composition
The main drawback of the baseline model is that it only allows for a single
oil price shock which may be a mixture of oil demand and oil supply shocks.
Hence, the counterintuitive result obtained before might be the consequence
of an incomplete identification scheme.7 Kilian (2009) addresses this problem
by decomposing oil price changes into three components, namely, shocks
to world economic demand, to world oil supply and to oil-specific demand.
The latter captures shifts in market concerns about the availability of future
oil supply and is therefore also called precautionary demand for oil. To
implement this, we add the Kilian (2009) three-equation oil market model to
a VAR model of the German economy in a way similar to Fukunaga et al.
(2010). Specifically, the resulting VAR model has the form
(
Y1,t
Y2,t
)
=
(
A11(L) 0
A21(L) A22(L)
)(
Y1,t
Y2,t
)
+
(
u1,t
u2,t
)
, (3.2)
7Additionally, the linear relationship between oil price changes and output could be
criticized. Hamilton (1996, 2003) proposes nonlinear transformations of oil price increases,
called net oil price increases, to better capture asymmetric effects of oil price shocks.
However, if one replaces the nominal oil price by net oil price increases, the results of the
VAR model do not change considerably. In particular, we still do not obtain recessionary
tendencies after an oil price shock.
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where Y1,t defines the vector of global oil market variables and consists of the
world oil production, global industrial production and the nominal WTI oil
price in US dollars.8 Here we denominate the oil price in US dollars rather
than in euros to be in line with Fukunaga et al. (2010) and Peersman and
Van Robays (2009). The vector Y2,t denotes the domestic macroeconomic
block and contains the industrial production, the producer price index, the
three-month Euribor and the indicator for price competitiveness as in the
baseline model.
We estimate this Kilian-type VAR model using monthly data over the pe-
riod from January 1980 to February 2009.9 The VAR features a constant
and 12 lags. All variables are seasonally adjusted, expressed in logs and
transformed to first differences, except for the nominal interest rate.10 For
the identification of the structural shocks to the global oil market we fol-
low the recursiveness assumption by Kilian (2009). To identify oil supply
shocks as innovations to global oil production, it is assumed that there ex-
ist no contemporaneous reactions of global oil production to global demand
shocks and oil-specific demand shocks. This assumption is consistent with
the consensus view in the literature that the short-run elasticity of oil supply
is low. To disentangle the remaining two shocks, it is imposed that the oil-
specific demand shock does not affect global industrial production on impact.
For the domestic variables we allow that they respond contemporaneously to
all oil market shocks. Moreover, we impose a lower triangular structure for
the domestic macroeconomic block with the following ordering: industrial
production, producer price index, Euribor and price competitiveness.
The cumulative (level) responses of the oil market variables and the German
variables are shown in Figures 3.2 to 3.4. A negative oil supply shock leads
to a permanent decline in oil production but has only a small and transitory
8Global industrial production is proxied by the industrial production of the OECD
countries plus the six major non-member economies. The oil price is given in nominal
instead of real terms because of the endogeneity problem discussed in Footnote 2. By
using these two variables, we follow Fukunaga, Hirakata and Sudo (2010).
9Estimating the oil market block with monthly data from January 1973 to December
2008 replicates the results of Fukunaga, Hirakata and Sudo (2010). However, our estima-
tion sample starts 1980 to be consistent with the micro data approach reported below.
10Unlike Peersman and Smets (2003), both Kilian (2009) and Fukunaga et al. (2010)
estimate their VAR models in first differences. To facilitate comparison with their results,
we follow their specification.
52
effect on the oil price. The German variables are largely unaffected. Hence,
we obtain the same counterintuitive result as in the baseline model. This time
it is even more surprising, as the Kilian-type model is intended to carefully
identify a classical oil supply shock.
Figure 3.2: Cumulative Responses to an Oil Supply Shock in the Recursive
Kilian Model (68-, 90- and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals)
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The global demand shock immediately shifts global industrial production up-
wards by 0.5 percent. The effect peaks after 18 months at 1.5 percent and
remains significant for more than four years. As a consequence of this strong
and long-lasting increase in world demand, both oil supply and oil prices
significantly increase for a sustained period of time. Given the export ori-
entation of the German economy, German production reacts more strongly
than world production and peaks after 20 months. At the same time, do-
mestic prices increase and the central bank responds with an interest rate
hike.
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative Responses to a Global Demand Shock in the
Recursive Kilian Model (68-, 90- and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals)
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The oil-specific demand shock possesses a large and persistent effect on the oil
price but not on oil production or world demand. Therefore, it only transmits
to German producer prices which increase significantly. The influence on
German industrial production is small and very short-lived.
We conclude that identifying oil price shocks by means of the Kilian approach
does not alter the counterintuitive result of the baseline model that supply
determined oil price shocks do not affect German economic activity. Instead
we find that global demand shocks are of prime importance. That they raise
both global oil prices and industrial production might explain the finding of
the baseline model that a general – and thus difficult to interpret – oil price
hike temporarily increases German production.
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Figure 3.4: Cumulative Responses to an Oil-Specific Demand Shock in the
Recursive Kilian Model (68-, 90- and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals)
10 20 30 40
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
World Production of Oil           
Months after Oil-Specific Demand Shock
P
e r
c e
n t
 d
e v
i a
t i o
n
 
 
10 20 30 40
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
Industrial World Production       
Months after Oil-Specific Demand Shock
P
e r
c e
n t
 d
e v
i a
t i o
n
10 20 30 40
0
5
10
15
Oil Price in Dollar               
Months after Oil-Specific Demand Shock
P
e r
c e
n t
 d
e v
i a
t i o
n
10 20 30 40
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Industrial Production             
Months after Oil-Specific Demand Shock
P
e r
c e
n t
 d
e v
i a
t i o
n
10 20 30 40
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Producer Price Index              
Months after Oil-Specific Demand Shock
P
e r
c e
n t
 d
e v
i a
t i o
n
10 20 30 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Euribor                           
Months after Oil-Specific Demand Shock
P
e r
c e
n t
 d
e v
i a
t i o
n
95% CI
90% CI
68% CI
Point Estimate
3.2.3 The Kilian Type VAR Model with Sign Restric-
tions
In more recent papers, Baumeister, Peersman and Van Robays (2009) and
Peersman and Van Robays (2009) try to relax the recursive identification
assumptions imposed by Kilian (2009). They use the method of sign re-
strictions proposed by Peersman (2005) and Uhlig (2005) to disentangle the
structural shocks affecting the oil price. More specifically, to identify an oil
supply shock, a world demand shock and an oil-specific demand shock they
restrict the impulse responses of global industrial production, global oil pro-
duction and the oil price. In contrast to the Cholesky decomposition, this
identification approach uses soft restrictions in the sense that no zero restric-
tions are placed on the contemporaneous impact matrix. Our baseline sign
restrictions are fully consistent with the restrictions used in the analysis of
Peersman and Van Robays (2009) and are summarized in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Sign Restrictions (Restriction Period of 6 Months)
Oil Supply Global Demand Oil-specific
Shock Shock Demand Shock
Oil Production ≤ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
Global Production ≤ 0 ≥ 0 ≤ 0
Oil Price ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
These restrictions imply that a contractionary oil supply shock raises the
price of oil and reduces the global production of industrial goods and oil.
A positive global demand shock raises oil production, global industrial pro-
duction and the price of oil. A positive oil-specific demand shock triggers a
contraction of world output while the price and the supply of oil increase.
Unlike Peersman and Van Robays (2009) we do not impose restrictions on
any of the response functions for a whole year. We prefer a shorter restric-
tion period of 6 months, as the results of the recursive identification scheme
above suggest that a restriction period of 12 months might be a too strong
assumption.11
Figures 3.5 to 3.7 depict the cumulated (level) impulse responses of the oil
market and domestic variables together with the 16th and 84th percentile
error bands.12 All responses have been normalized to an increase in the price
of oil by 10 percent. The effects of a negative oil supply shock identified
with sign restrictions are grossly comparable to those identified above with
the Cholesky decomposition. As the major difference, the shock now leads
to a significant contraction in world output. This translates into German
industrial production, albeit not significantly so. Moreover, as before the
German producer price index does not react at all. Hence, it is questionable
whether this is really an oil supply shock. Concerning the other two shocks,
11This point is supported by the finding that the sign restriction algorithm takes a very
long time (several weeks) in order to find the given number of admissible draws for a
restriction period of 12 months.
12Again, the VAR-system is estimated by using monthly data over the period from Jan-
uary 1980 to February 2009. The VAR features a constant and all variables are seasonally
adjusted, expressed in logs and transformed to first differences, except for the nominal in-
terest rate. Note that the error bands are calculated with a Bayesian method of inference
and not by the Hall bootstrap procedure. We report 68 percent confidence intervals as
usual in the literature on Bayesian VAR models.
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Figure 3.5: Cumulative Responses to an Oil Supply Shock Using Sign
Restrictions (68 Percent Confidence Intervals)
the qualitative results do not seem to depend strongly on the identification
scheme. For example, a global demand shock leads to a gradual increase
in German production and prices which is qualitatively and in magnitude
similar to the results reported above, while the dynamic patterns change
somewhat.
Overall, we find that the sign restriction approach does not allow to con-
vincingly identify an oil supply shock which simultaneously shifts German
production down and producer prices up. Besides this, in a recent paper
Kilian and Murphy (2010) cast doubts on the empirical results based solely
on sign restrictions. In their view the results are biased due to the fact that
the eventual impulse response functions are constructed as the medians of
all admissible solutions to the sign restriction problem and many of them
imply implausible magnitudes for the instantaneous impact on oil market
variables, especially the short run elasticity of oil supply. This finally leads
57
Figure 3.6: Cumulative Responses to a Global Demand Shock Using Sign
Restrictions (68 Percent Confidence Intervals)
to an overestimation of the relevance of oil supply shocks.13
Taking all the previous results together we have to conclude that the VAR
models proposed in the literature have difficulties to identify oil price shocks
in a satisfactory way. In particular, the German output reactions are small
and lack statistical significance. Does this mean that oil price shocks do not
matter for economic activity? Given the importance attached to these shocks
in the public and professional debate, this interpretation appears premature.
It seems much more likely that the VAR models were not successful in disen-
tangling supply and demand side developments. Therefore, in the remainder
of the essay we proceed as follows. In a first step, we examine the direct
13We find that this is relevant also for our dataset. Once we impose an upper bound
for the absolute short term elasticity of industrial production to an oil supply shock, the
significance of the impulse response is reduced further. Detailed results are available upon
request.
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Figure 3.7: Cumulative Responses to an Oil-Specific Demand Shock Using
Sign Restrictions (68 Percent Confidence Intervals)
effects of oil price changes on output and price setting at the firm level. This
should help us to understand whether there are any noticeable contractionary
effects of oil price hikes. The advantage of using firm-level data is that we
can control for demand-side developments that otherwise may contaminate
the results. However, we cannot derive general equilibrium results from a
microeconometric analysis as feedback effects are neglected. Therefore, in
a second step, we derive an indicator from the firm-level data that signals
whether the firms are, on average, in a “supply regime” (output and prices
move in opposite directions) as opposed to a “demand regime” (output and
prices move in the same direction). We then use this indicator to identify oil
price shocks within a VAR model of the German macroeconomy.
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3.3 The Effects of Oil Price Shocks on the
Firm Level
For an average individual firm, a hike in the oil price has ceteris paribus a
direct cost effect that should unambiguously lead to a reduction in output and
an increase of sales prices. On the aggregate level, this effect might be masked
if, for example, the oil price hike reflects an increase in world demand. While
an appropriate identification scheme should be able to separate out such
demand-side shocks, the results of the VAR models analysed in the previous
section indicated that this task is difficult to achieve without recourse to
additional information.
Lescaroux (2011) argues that an analysis on the slightly more disaggregate
sectoral level yields the expected result that an increase in oil prices depresses
production. However, even at the sectoral level, the identification problem is
not easily solved unless one is willing to impose an exogeneity restriction on
the oil price (as done by Lescaroux, 2011). Therefore, in the following we use
firm level survey data which allow us to control for demand developments that
are exogenous to the firm. To this end, we estimate a production function and
a price setting function for the average German industrial firm and introduce
the aggregate oil price as one of the explanatory variables. It turns out
that the oil price has a significantly negative effect on production and a
significantly positive effect on prices. After a brief description of the data set
we explain our estimation strategy and present our results.
3.3.1 The Survey Data
To measure firm-level production and pricing in the German industry, we use
the monthly business tendency survey of the Ifo Institute (for a description
of the survey see Appendix A). Specifically, we consider two survey ques-
tions. The question “Compared to the previous month, our domestic level
of production has decreased/remained unchanged/increased.” characterizes
the change in production (production). The question “Compared to the
previous month, our domestic sales prices have been increased/remained un-
changed/decreased.” is used to assess the change in prices (price). For these
and all comparable questions, the answers are coded as -1 (“decreased”),
0 (“unchanged”), and +1 (“increased”). Note that we analyse qualitative
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answers, i.e., firms report the direction but not the size of the changes. How-
ever, aggregating the firm-level data by subtracting the percentage of price
decreases from the percentage of price increases for each month leads to time
series that resemble macroeconomic conditions quite well, see Figures 3.8 and
3.9. The correlation of the aggregated survey production series and the Ger-
man industrial production is about 0.75, the correlation of the aggregated
survey sales price series and the German producer price index is about 0.5.
Figure 3.8: Aggregated Micro Production Data and Industrial Production
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To account for firm-specific demand developments we consider two addi-
tional survey questions: the change in demand a firm faces (demand) and
the change in incoming orders (orders). Further firm-specific information is
included by using size and sector dummies. Concerning the size of a firm,
we know whether the number of employees is below 50, between 50 and 199,
between 200 and 499, between 500 and 999, or equal or above 1000. From
this, five dummy variables are constructed that can also be interpreted as
proxies for labor input in the production function. To control for sectoral
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differences, we add dummy variables that categorize the firms in one of the
14 industrial sectors listed in Appendix A. To account for geographical effects
a dummy variable for Eastern Germany is included.
We use data of the period from January 1980 to February 2009.14 The
dataset is organized as an unbalanced panel of around 11,000 firms of the
manufacturing industry, which have participated at least 48 times in the
survey.
Figure 3.9: Aggregated Micro Sales Price Data and Producer Price Level
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3.3.2 Modeling the Firm Level Effects of Oil Price
Shocks
To identify the direct firm-level effects of oil price changes, we specify the
following production and price setting functions which can be understood as
14The firm-level dataset is available to researchers with a delay.
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general reduced form equations. We add various control variables to ensure
that the effects are not spurious.
The production function is
yit = oilitβ1 +MACRO
Ger
it β2 +MACRO
US
it β3 +DEMANDitβ4
+DFIRMitβ5 +DMONTHitβ6 +DEV ENTitβ7 + uit, (3.3)
where the production volume, yit, is a latent quantitative variable that relates
to the qualitative survey variable, productionit, by the observation rule
productionit =

−1, if yit ≤ α1
0, if α1 < yit ≤ α2
+1, if α2 < yit
(3.4)
with threshold values α1 and α2. The variable of main interest, oilit, is defined
as the firm-specific percentage change of the WTI oil price in euros between
month t and the last time firm i changed its production volume. We use this
cumulative difference because firms do not report production changes every
month. By regressing on this cumulative variable we face the problem of
potential endogeneity due to its state dependency. To alleviate this issue we
follow the recommendations of Wooldridge (2005) and add the first individual
observation of the dependent variable as an additional regressor to the model.
To be consistent with the baseline VAR model, we also include the remain-
ing German and US macroeconomic variables, denoted as MACROGerit and
MACROUSit , respectively.
15 Like the oil price, all these variables are defined
as percentage changes since the last revision of the production volume except
for the interest rates for which the changes are given in percentage points.
By DEMANDit we denote a vector of variables that control for the demand
situation faced by an individual firm which is assumed to be predetermined
in the month of a survey. Specifically, we use the survey variables represent-
ing the change in demand (demand) and the change in orders (orders). For
15The German variables are industrial production, the producer price index, the three
month Euribor, and the indicator of price competitiveness. The US variables are industrial
production and the Fed funds rate.
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both of them, there again exist three answer categories: -1=decrease, 0=un-
changed, 1=increase. As these variables have an ordered outcome and the
interpretation of coefficients estimated for such variables is not very conve-
nient, we split each of them into two dummy variables. One dummy equals
1 if there is an increase and 0 otherwise and the other equals 1 if there is
a decrease and 0 otherwise. We label them with the suffixes up and down,
respectively.16
To address the problem of unobserved firm heterogeneity concerning our
firm-specific variables we include the vector DFIRMit of firm-specific control
variables. These include averages of each firm-specific variable as proposed by
Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984). By introducing these averages we
try to capture unobserved individual effects associated with the firm-specific
variables and therefore to alleviate the issue of unobserved heterogeneity.
In addition, we use a set of dummy variables controlling for the firm size,
the sectoral classification as described above, and the geographical allocation
(Western versus Eastern Germany).17
Finally, we control for specific time patterns. First, seasonal effects
are accounted for by including dummies for each month of the year
(DMONTHit).
18 Second, we also control for important institutional events
that could have influenced the behavior of the firms (DEV ENTit). The
events considered are the physical introduction of the euro in 2002 and the
changes in the level of the value added tax in 1983, 1993, 1998 and 2007.
These dummies are equal to one for the month the change happened and
for the past and following three months, as some firms may have reacted in
advance or with a delay.
Because of the latent structure of the left-hand side variable, we estimate
the parameters of the production function by means of an ordered probit
model. To avoid distortions of the estimated standard errors we cluster the
data on the firm level. To control for the decrease of observations in our
16Furthermore, to tackle the potential problem of endogeneity between our firm-specific
variables and our dependent variable we additionally apply a robustness check by including
these variables as first lags in an alternative specification.
17The baseline dummy for the firm size is the dummy representing a firm size in terms
of the number of employees of equal or above 1000. The baseline sectoral classification is
the machinery industry. The baseline geographical allocation is Western Germany.
18The baseline month is December.
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panel data over time we weight the observations with respect to the number
of observations of the corresponding time period.19 Furthermore, to provide
an additional robustness check with respect to the panel structure of our
dataset we also apply a linear fixed effects panel estimator.
Missing observations are handled as follows. In all estimations reported below
we use a dataset from which incomplete spells are dropped, because the
calculation of cumulative differences requires spells that start and end with
a production change. As a robustness check, we repeated all estimations by
replacing missing observations with zeros which seems natural because the
“no change” answer strongly dominates in the sample. The results remained
qualitatively unchanged which suggests that concentrating on complete spells
does not create a selection bias.
As a second equation we specify the price setting function of the firms. The
dependent variable, price, is again qualitative. The right-hand side of the
price setting equation is the same as in (3.3) as it is highly likely that a
reduced form equation for the price setting equation contains the same ex-
planatory variables as the reduced form equation for the production function.
The macroeconomic variables are defined as the cumulative differences since
the last price change. For the price setting decision, this approach reflects a
possible menu cost behavior of the firms (see Loupias and Sevestre, 2010).
We again create spells of consecutive observations, which start and end with
a price change. Finally, to account for the lower trend inflation for the time
after 1990, we include a dummy variable for this period.20
19The decrease of observations over time reflects the change in the economic structure
in Germany (decreasing importance of the industrial sector) rather than problems of the
survey to acquire participants. However, we also present an estimation without the time
weights as robustness check.
20Before 1990 average inflation was more that 1 percentage point higher than thereafter.
This can also be seen in the price setting behavior of the firms if one computes the fractions
of companies stating that they have raised or lowered their prices.
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3.3.3 Results
The estimation results for the production function are shown in the Columns
1-5 of Table 3.2.21 According to our baseline result in Column 1, an oil price
hike significantly decreases the probability that a firm raises its production
(and, vice versa, significantly increases the probability that a firms lowers
its production). Columns 2-5 display several variations of the model and
the estimation method to check for the robustness of this result. First, we
use an ordered probit estimator without time-weights, i.e., we neglect that
the number of firms in the panel decreases over time (Column 2). Second,
we drop the time dummies representing institutional events like value added
tax reforms or the introduction of the euro because one could argue that
there is some arbitrariness in choosing these events and not others (Column
3). Third, we lag the firm-specific variables by one month to minimize any
potential endogeneity problem (Column 4). Finally, we apply a fixed effects
panel estimator to take into account the panel structure of our dataset (Col-
umn 5). In all cases the effect of the oil price is negative, highly significant,
and of similar magnitude.
Furthermore, an increase in firm-specific demand, as measured by demandup
and ordersup, leads to an increase in production, while a decrease in demand,
as measured by demanddown and ordersdown, triggers a slightly asymmetric
decrease in production. These effects are much stronger than the effects of
our macroeconomic variables which suggests that the demand situation plays
a central role for the production decision of a firm. Therefore, it is important
to control for firm-specific demand if one wants to identify the direct effects
of oil price increases. Otherwise, the positive correlation of oil prices and
world demand in boom periods may bias the estimated oil price coefficient.
The results for the price setting function of the firms are displayed in the
Columns 6-10 of Table 3.2. The baseline result in Column 6 shows that
an oil price hike significantly increases the probability that a firm raises its
prices. This result is robust to the same variations in the model and the
estimation method as described for the production function, see Columns
7-10. Moreover, the effects of the firm-specific demand variables are again
21Detailed results are available from the authors upon request. It turns out that the
dummies controlling for the sector, the company size, the value added tax reforms, the
implementation of the euro, and for seasonality are mostly significant.
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statistically significant, quantitatively important, and of the expected sign.
To sum up, controlling for the firm-specific demand situation we find signif-
icant effects of oil price changes on the firm level in the German industrial
sector: firms cut their production volume and increase their sales prices.
Hence, from this perspective oil price changes can be interpreted as classical
supply shocks.
3.4 Using a Supply Regime Indicator to Iden-
tify Oil Supply Shocks
The preceding analysis yielded conflicting results regarding the recessionary
impact of oil price hikes. On the one hand, using VAR models it turned
out to be difficult to convincingly identify negative oil supply shocks that
significantly reduce aggregate output. On the other hand, using firm level
data there was strong evidence that an average firm reacts to an increase in
oil prices by cutting down on production. While it is certainly not possible
to derive general equilibrium conclusions from a microeconometric produc-
tion equation as feedback effects are not modeled, this approach neverthe-
less seems to deliver information that is not already contained in typical
VAR models. Therefore, it could be beneficial to combine the firm level in-
formation with an otherwise standard VAR model in order to improve the
identification of an oil supply shock to the German economy.
Our approach to use the firm level information is as follows. We calculate the
fraction of firms in a given month which report that they move output and
prices in opposite directions. If the fraction is large, we conclude that the
economy is in a “supply regime”. Assuming that oil supply shocks generate
output and price reactions of opposite sign, it seems sensible to concentrate
the VAR based search for oil supply shocks on these periods. We implement
this by assuming that the effect of an oil price shock depends on how deeply
the economy is in a supply regime. It turns out that this is sufficient to gen-
erate impulse responses that coincide with both our theoretical expectations
and the microeconomic evidence presented above. It should be noted that
the definition of what we call a supply regime is not directly related to the
development of oil prices because there can be many reasons why prices and
output move into opposite directions. Hence, not only oil price shocks can
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give rise to supply regimes but all sorts of cost push and technology shocks.
This implies that we do not force the VAR to deliver the expected results
but simply confine the search to more promising periods. Whether oil price
shocks play any role in these periods is left unconstrained.
In the following, the construction of the indicator is described in detail.
Subsequently, the indicator is introduced as an interaction variable into an
otherwise standard VAR model to analyse how oil price shocks affect the
German economy during supply regimes. Finally, some robustness checks
are provided.
3.4.1 Construction of the Supply Regime Indicator
The economy-wide supply regime indicator shall condense the firm level sur-
vey information to detect time periods where disproportionately many firms
move their production and prices in opposite directions. To this end, for each
firm a supply regime indicator Sfirmit is constructed by subtracting the price
response from the production response. Since both production and price re-
sponses are coded as −1 (decreased), 0 (unchanged) and +1 (increased), the
new variable can have 5 different outcomes, see Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Possible Outcomes for the Firm-Specific Supply Regime
Indicator
Price Price Price
Increased Unchanged Decreased
Production Increased 0 +1 +2
Production Unchanged −1 0 +1
Production Decreased −2 −1 0
The outcome −2 indicates that the firm is in a contractionary supply regime
as it increases its price and decreases its production level, while a value of +2
indicates an expansionary supply regime where the price is reduced and the
production volume is raised. Intermediate cases are coded with −1, 0, and
+1. Note that what might be called a demand regime – price and production
move in the same direction – is coded as 0.
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To calculate an economy-wide supply regime indicator we simply take the
cross-sectional average of the firm-specific indicator at each month,
St =
1
Nt
N∑
i=1
Sfirmit ∗ 100 (3.5)
and center the resulting time series at zero. The upper panel of Figure
3.10 depicts the economy-wide indicator together with the month on month
growth rate of the WTI oil price in euros. To enhance readability, both
series are smoothed by means of a centered 12-month moving average. The
supply regime indicator is particularly negative at the beginning of the 1980s
after the second oil price shock, in late 2001 following the the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, and in the second half of 2008 after the strong oil price increases.
However, there is no clear stable relationship between the indicator and the
movements of the oil price. This implies that the indicator carries information
not already contained in the oil price.
3.4.2 Identification of Oil Price Shocks during Supply
Regimes
To concentrate the VAR based search for oil price shocks on supply regimes,
we use an interaction variable approach. To this end, we normalize the
absolute value of the economy-wide supply regime indicator such that it
takes values between 0 and 1. Let us denote this variable by It. It takes
on values near 1 if many firms move their output and prices into opposite
directions which signals that the economy is in a supply regime. We then
multiply It with the WTI oil price in euros, oilt, which yields the interaction
Ioilt = Itoilt. This is introduced into our baseline VAR model as follows:
Yt = B(L)Xt + A(L)Yt−1 + C(L)Ioilt−1 + ut, (3.6)
where as before Y (t) denotes the vector of endogenous variables (the WTI oil
price in euros, the industrial production, the producer price index, the three-
month Euribor and the indicator for price competitiveness) and Xt comprises
the exogenous variables (US industrial production and the effective Fed funds
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Figure 3.10: Economy-Wide Supply Regime Indicator
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rate). The vector of lag polynomials C(L) corresponds to the interaction
and can be interpreted as follows. During deep (positive or negative) supply
regimes the indicator is near one. In this case, the total effect of the oil price
on the left-hand side variables is the sum of the lag polynomial C(L) and
the respective coefficients related to the oil price in the lag polynomial B(L).
Put differently, if the oil price is ordered first in vector Yt, we add the first
column of each matrix in A(L) to the corresponding vector of C(L). In the
other extreme, e.g. during strong demand regime periods, the indicator is 0
and C(L) can thus be neglected. In average times, the indicator is between
0 and 1 and downweights the coefficients in C(L).
The interaction setup can be interpreted in two different ways. We prefer
to think of it as a tool to disentangle oil supply from other shocks to oil
prices, notably demand shocks. This is possible if oil supply shocks dominate
other oil shocks during supply regimes. Hence, we do not identify world
demand or oil-specific demand shocks. Moreover, we neither argue that oil
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supply shocks were absent during non-supply regime periods nor that other
oil price shocks were absent during supply periods. All we say is that oil
supply shocks dominate and are thus easy to identify during supply regime
periods, i.e., during periods in which many firms move prices and output in
opposite directions. Hence, the respective column in A(L) characterizes the
average impact of a very general oil price shock during non-supply regime
periods while C(L) contains the additional effect during supply regimes that
is presumed to be due to an oil supply shock. Their sum is thus the total
effect that can be attributed to oil supply shocks.
Alternatively, the interaction dummy setup can be thought of as a way to
detect non-linear relationships in the transmission of oil price shocks to the
German economy. In contrast to Hamilton (1996, 2003), who proposes non-
linear transformations of oil price increases, our approach then poses that a
general oil price shock may have different effects during supply regime pe-
riods and other times, no matter whether it is positive or negative. As a
robustness check, we also restrict our indicator variable to contractionary
supply regime periods, i.e., to periods when many firms reduce output and
raise prices. As described below, this does not change the results markedly.
The interaction VAR model is estimated in levels using monthly data over
the period from January 1980 to February 2009. It features a constant and a
linear trend.22 All variables are seasonally adjusted and expressed in natural
logarithms, except for the nominal interest rate. The model is estimated
as a subset VAR where the oil price defines the only subset variable. The
covariance matrix is orthogonalized by means of a Cholesky decomposition,
where the oil price is placed on the first position. For the remaining variables
we choose the same ordering as in Section 2.
Figure 3.11 displays the impulse responses during a supply regime. The oil
price shock triggers a very persistent increase in the oil price which peaks at
nearly 10 percent after one month. Producer prices jump upwards on impact
and rise further for more than one year. Industrial production does not
change significantly during the first few months but it starts falling within
the first year and remains below zero for an extended period of time. This is
22We do not include the supply regime indicator It in levels as its interpretation is not
straightforward. However, if we do so as recommended by, e.g., Brambor et al. (2005) for
interaction models, the impulse responses remain largely unchanged.
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very different to the standard VAR model without interaction term analysed
above. Probably as a reaction to rising prices, the nominal interest rate goes
slightly up on impact and is lowered only after industrial production has
started to decrease. The results indicate that it is possible to identify oil
price shocks which lead to a slump in production and a rise in prices.
Figure 3.11: Impulse Response Functions to an Oil Price Shock during a
Supply Regime (68-, 90- and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals)
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3.4.3 Robustness Checks
In this section we provide a number of robustness checks. As the first check,
we redefine the firm specific supply regime indicator by assigning to it a
−2 if the firm increases its price and decreases its production level, a +2 if
the firm decreases its price and increases its production level, and a 0 else.
This means that, unlike before, all intermediate cases, where one of the two
variables changes and the other one is constant, are coded as 0. Thereby,
possible misallocations of periods as supply regimes that are in fact demand
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regimes are circumvented and the indicator becomes more selective. All other
steps remain unchanged. The resulting impulse responses are very similar
to the baseline interaction VAR with the only exception that the short-term
response of industrial production becomes significant, see Figure 3.12 (upper
left panel).23
Figure 3.12: Impulse Response Functions to an Oil Price Shock (68-, 90-
and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals) – Robustness Check 1
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Following Hamilton (1996, 2003), who stresses the importance of oil price
increases as opposed to decreases, we also consider to select only contractive
supply periods, i.e., periods in which unusually many firms reduce output
and raise prices. To this end, we set all values of It to zero for which the
economy-wide supply regime indicator is positive. This means that we con-
centrate only on periods where our indicator provides evidence for a negative
supply regime. This may have two advantages: First, the motivation for the
23Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
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essay was the question whether and how the 2008 oil price contributed to
the subsequent recession. Second, by identifying periods where the indica-
tor features very positive values, we encounter the potential problem of not
being able to distinguish between a cost shock (such as an oil price shock)
and a positive technology shock. Assuming that economic contractions are
rather not caused by negative technology shocks, this problem is mitigated
during negative supply regimes. The impulse response of industrial produc-
tion extracted from negative supply periods only is displayed in the upper
right panel of Figure 3.12. It is very similar to the one extracted from both
positive and negative supply periods. The same holds for all other impulse
responses. Only the confidence bands are now tighter. This could reflect that
it is easier to identify contractionary as opposed to expansionary oil supply
shocks, which is in accordance with the findings of Hamilton (1996, 2003).
To examine whether our results are driven by influential observations at the
beginning and the end of the sample, we report estimation results based
on either the period from January 1980 to December 2007 or the period
from January 1983 to December 2009. The first sample excludes the recent
recession and the preceding oil price hike in 2008, the second sample excludes
the effects of the second oil price crisis that – according to our indicator – led
to a contractive supply regime during 1980-82, see Figure 3.11. The resulting
impulse responses are provided in the lower panels of Figure 3.12 and show
that our previous findings remain largely unaltered. However, excluding the
first three years of the sample has the effect that the output response becomes
less persistent. Nevertheless, unlike Blanchard and Gali (2008), we still find
strongly significant effects for the sample starting in the mid-1980s.
Furthermore, one could argue that neglecting the firm size when calculating
our economy-wide supply regime indicator as an unweighted average across
all firms could distort the results. This is possible if, e.g., large firms are
better hedged against oil price risks and thus react more mildly than smaller
firms such that an unweighted average would be too volatile. To the extent
that this leads to a wrong identification of the supply regime periods, our
baseline results could be biased. Therefore, in a next step we use an indicator
that is constructed as a cross-sectional average weighted by firm size. Firm
size is measured as the fraction of employees in firm i of the total number of
employees at time t (empfracit). The weighted economy-wide supply regime
indicator is then constructed from the firm-specific supply regime variables
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Sfirmit – defined as the firm’s production response minus its price response –
as
S˜t =
∑
i
empfracitS
firm
it ∗ 100. (3.7)
After centering this variable, we proceed in the same way as in the baseline
interaction VAR. It turns out that accounting for the firm size does not
change our findings to a large extent. In particular the impulse response
of production remains largely unchanged, see the upper left panel of Figure
3.13.
Figure 3.13: Impulse Response Functions to an Oil Price Shock (68-, 90-
and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals) – Robustness Check 2
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As a final robustness check, we use a zero-one instead of a continuous inter-
action. To this end, we construct a dummy variable Dt that is assigned a
value of 1 if in a certain month the economy-wide supply regime indicator lies
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outside the range [−v, v]. To limit the arbitrariness of a specific threshold
value v we report the results for three different choices, namely v = 0.8416σ,
v = 1.000σ, and v = 1.2816σ, where σ is the sample standard deviation of
the supply regime indicator. Under normality, these thresholds correspond
to the 20, 16, and 10 percent quantiles, respectively. We then replace Ioilt in
(3.6) with Doilt = Dtoilt and leave everything else unchanged. The resulting
impulse responses of industrial production after an oil supply shock are dis-
played in the upper right and the two lower panels of Figure 3.13. It turns
out that the downswing in production is the larger the more observations are
placed in the non-supply regime. This is the expected result as on the flip
side this means that the reaction becomes (absolutely) stronger the smaller
and, thus, the more extreme the sample is from which the oil supply shock
is identified. Still, the exercise demonstrates that our identification strategy
does not depend very strongly on how the dummy is defined. In addition,
the difference to the continuous interaction approach is not substantial.
3.5 How Strongly Did the 2007/08 Oil Price
Hike Contribute to the Recession in Ger-
many?
In the preceding section we have shown that there exists a clear relationship
between oil price changes and real economic activity. Now we examine how
strongly the oil price hike in 2007/08 contributed to the recent recession in
Germany. To this end, we set all oil price shocks from July 2007 to February
2009 to zero and calculate the counterfactual development of the variables
endogenous to our VAR model. We find that both the initial increase and
the subsequent decline in oil prices would not have occurred, see Figure 3.14
(left panel). Without the shocks, the oil price would have stayed between
50 and 60 euros per barrel until mid-2008 instead of rising up to almost 90
euros. Being partly driven by the US business cycle it would have dropped
to 40 euros during the US recession and recovered to 60 euros by December
2009.24
The effect on German industrial production can be inferred from the right
24Note that our estimation sample ends in February 2009, hence this is an out-of-sample
forecast and must be taken with great caution.
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Figure 3.14: Counterfactual Analysis for Industrial Production
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panel of Figure 3.14. Even without the oil price shocks, there would have
been a huge drop in German production because in the counterfactual exper-
iment we leave the US industrial production and the Fed funds rate plunge
as actually observed, which in turn drives Germany into a recession. Nev-
ertheless, the oil price has a non-negligible effect on German production.
The extent of this effect depends on the development of the supply regime
indicator which took values between 0.5 and 1.0 since August 2008. As we
did not model this variable, we assume that an endogenized counterfactual
indicator would have been within this range. Specifically, we perform two
counterfactual experiments taking as given over the whole simulation period
an indicator value of either 0.5 or 1.0. It turns out that without the oil price
shocks, average production in 2009 would have been between 1.9 and 2.7
percent higher for supply regime indicator values of 0.5 and 1.0, respectively.
At first sight, a direct oil price effect on German output in the range of 2.5
percent appears to be small given a total drop in production of more than
15 percent from 2008 to 2009. However, the average annual growth rate of
German production between 1991 and 2007 was as small as 1.2 percent and
thus only half of the oil price effect. In addition, one has to bear in mind
that the experiment leaves US industrial production and the Fed funds rate
as actually observed because they are exogenous to our VAR model. To the
extent that the oil price hike had a contractive effect on the US business cycle,
the transmission to German production would have been stronger. Hence,
our results can be interpreted as a lower bound for the unknown total effect.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this essay we have shown that the oil price still has an economically and
statistically significant effect on aggregate production in Germany. Thereby,
we challenged the view put forward in an important branch of the literature
that oil price increases have lost their influence on the macroeconomy since
the mid-1980s. We arrived at this conclusion in three steps.
First, when estimating standard VAR models often used to assess the impact
of oil price shocks on macro variables, we replicated the neutrality result of
the literature. It is however debatable whether this finding really reflects
the unimportance of oil products for the economy or whether it must be
attributed to the difficulty to identify an oil price shock that is not contam-
inated by demand developments. This is important because demand shocks
move output and oil prices simultaneously in the same direction and may
thus obscure the negative effect of independent oil price shocks on output.
Therefore, in a second step, we analysed the effect of oil price changes on
output and prices at the firm level using a unique survey dataset for German
manufacturing firms. The microeconomic approach has the advantage that
problems of endogeneity and reverse causality are circumvented. Moreover,
the data allow to control for demand shifts faced by the firms. Estimating re-
duced form production and pricing functions yielded the result that oil price
hikes lower production and increase prices. From this we concluded that oil
price shocks should be easier to identify on the macro level if we concentrate
on supply regime periods, i.e., on periods in which output and prices move
into opposite directions.
In a third step, we implemented this idea by constructing a survey based
indicator that signals how deeply the German economy is in a so-defined
supply regime. We augmented an otherwise standard VAR model for the
aggregate economy with this indicator and obtained the same result as on
the micro level, namely, that positive oil price shocks lead to rising prices
and declining output. In a counterfactual analysis we showed that oil price
changes are not only statistically significant but also quantitatively relevant:
Without the 2007/08 oil price hike, German industrial production in 2009
would have been around 2.5 percent higher than actually observed. Given
an average annual growth rate of 1.2 percent this is a notable effect. At the
same time, this result is not in conflict with the view that the oil price was
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not the major driver of the 2009 recession which witnesses a total drop in
production of more than 15 percent.
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Appendix
A The Ifo Business Tendency Survey
The micro data stem from the Ifo Business Tendency Survey for the German
manufacturing industry. The survey is conducted monthly since 1949 and
serves as base for the well-known Ifo Business Climate Index. However, due
to longitudinal consistency problems and availability of the micro data in a
processable form we only use the data since 1980. Before 1991, only firms
from West Germany participated in the survey. Subsequently, the panel was
enlarged to Eastern Germany. Currently, the total number of companies reg-
istered for the survey is about 3200. The participation rate is about 92 %,
resulting in a coverage ratio of about 35 % of the German manufacturing in-
dustry in terms of turnover (Goldrian, 2004). The firms are asked about the
development of certain key measures. These measures are classified in groups
concerning the current situation (business situation, volume of orders), ten-
dencies in the past month (demand, production level, domestic sales prices,
volume of orders), expectations for the next 3 months (production level, do-
mestic sales prices, exports and employment) and expectations for the next 6
months (business situation). The enterprises can give one of three categorical
answers (“1” positive, “2” neutral, “3” negative) per standard question.
For our analysis, the information on the production development, the price
development, the order development and the demand development is central.
In order to better understand the information the data set contains, this sec-
tion provides some details on the questionnaire design of the central variables.
As far as production realizations are concerned, firms are asked to answer the
following question: “Compared to the previous month, our domestic level of
production has decreased/remained unchanged/increased”. Concerning the
price realizations the firms are asked to answer the question “Compared to
the previous month, our domestic sales prices have been decreased/remained
unchanged/increased”. Regarding the demand situation, firms are asked to
answer the following question: “Compared to the previous month, our de-
mand situation has improved/remained unchanged/worsened”. Concerning
the order situation the firms are asked to answer the question “Compared
to the previous month, our overall level of orders has decreased/remained
unchanged/increased”.
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Furthermore, each firm is allocated to one of the following 14 manufacturing
subsectors: Food, Beverages and Tobacco; Textiles and Textile Products;
Tanning and Dressing of Leather; Cork and Wood Products except Fur-
niture; Pulp, Paper, Publishing and Printing; Refined Petroleum Products;
Chemicals and Chemical Products; Rubber and Plastic Products; Other Non-
metallic Mineral Products; Basic and Fabricated Metal Products; Machinery
and Equipment; Electrical and Optical Equipment; Transport Equipment;
Furniture, Manufacture. Finally, the data set provides a size classification of
the firms, categorizing the firms into 5 different size classes. The exact clas-
sification is as follows: “1” firm with less than 50 employees, “2” firm with
50-199 employees, “3” firm with 200-499 employees, “4” firm with 500-999
employees, “5” 1000 or more employees.
A more detailed overview about the questionnaire can be found in Becker
and Wohlrabe (2008).
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